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Sharansky warns of building ties with pro-Israel …

Natan Sharansky . (photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM/THE JERUSALEM POST)

Far-right European political groups that profess to love Israel often hold antisemitic views, Jewish Agency Chairman Natan Sharansky warned on Tuesday.

In an address in Jerusalem to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Sharansky asserted that there is a growing phenomenon of political groups on the Right in Europe returning to their Nazi pasts, while supporting Israel for its stand against Islamic extremism. But we should not fall into the trap, he said.

Sharansky noted that Jews have become accustomed to left-wing groups who were vocally anti-Israel emphasizing positive feelings toward Jews.

For many years we have been used to dealing with organizations, countries and public figures who keep saying they love Jews, but hate Israel, he said.

Today, in addition to this, he explained, we are seeing the reverse phenomenon.

Those who love Israel and hate Jews and those who hate Israel and love Jews are not our partners, he affirmed. Actually, what should happen is that voices on the Right should fight antisemitism on the Right, and voices on the Left should fight antisemitism on the Left. It usually goes the other way, and its not a successful strategy, he noted.

But assimilation, in Sharanskys eyes, is the biggest problem for the Jewish world.

Im told only 12% of American Jews go to Jewish schools, he said, expressing concern that not enough US Jewish children are attending such schools, learning Hebrew, learning about Zionism and learning about Israel.

The number-one problem is the issue of assimilation in the American Jewish community. If we are not ready to defend and build our identity, no one will do it for us, he told the audience.

My aim is to build bridges between Israel and the Jewish people, he said, and spoke of the unique history of the Jewish Agency, which developed a very paternalistic approach toward the Jewish people.

Sharansky said, however, that he believed there was a new relationship between Israel and the Jewish communities of the Diaspora, and that he did not want Jews to view Israel just as a place of shelter. Israel is a unique country for Jews with quality and free Jewish life, he stressed. Today, all over the world, youre all part of the same team. The fact that this roundtable of Jewish agencies is having a dialogue, this is a great achievement.Sharansky is stepping down from the helm of the Jewish Agency in June.

Im finishing nine years in the Jewish Agency after nine years in a Soviet prison. They asked me to stay longer, and I said I cant add more time to the time I served in prison, quipped Sharansky, referring to the time he spent imprisoned as a Soviet refusenik in the 1970s and 80s.

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May 3, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

YIVO | Antisemitic Parties and Movements

Political groups seeking to limit the role of Jews in Central and East European states and societies emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century against the background of economic crisis, ethnic and political tensions, reaction to Jewish emancipation, and the increasing prominence of Jews in economic and cultural life. Such groups appeared first in Germany around 1880 and, shortly thereafter, in Austria-Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The Russian pogroms of 18811882 and the ritual murder accusations in Tiszaeszlr, Hungary (18821883), helped strengthen the so-called antisemitic movement in Central and Eastern Europe. At the first International Anti-Jewish Congress, held in Dresden in 1882, a picture of Eszter Solymosi, the victim of Tiszaeszlr, was prominently displayed, and among the Congresss delegates were three members of the Hungarian parliament. An Alliance Antijuive Universelle was established in 1886. Different circumstances governed the evolution and success of anti-emancipationist groups in different countries. In the Habsburg Empire, the emerging national movements often perceived Jews as agents of the dominant German culture and instruments of imperial authority. Thus, several political parties supported programs aimed at restricting or revoking the rights Jews had acquired through emancipation, and the Jewish question became a useful device for mobilizing voters.

Le Mouvement Anti-Smitique en Russie.” (The Antisemitic Movement in Russia). Cover of La Rpublique Illustre (no. 324; Paris, 25 September 1886) depicting mobs destroying attacking Jews and destroying a Jewish home in Nizhni Novgorod, Russia. (Moldovan Family Collection)

In Hungary, Jewish emancipation was granted in 1867. As early as 1875 a representative of the liberal party in power, Gyz Istczy (18421915), urged in parliament that Jewish immigration from the east be curbed and in 1878, in his so-called Palestine speech, proposed that Jews be sent off to a restored Jewish state. Istczy supported his position with both racial and religious arguments, and the rising tide of antisemitism in Germany and Austria, and later the pogroms in Russia, fueled his campaign. From 1880 he published the monthly 12 Rpirat, in which he announced the establishment of a Central Association of Non-Jewish Hungarians to fight against Jewish influence. Students at the University of Budapest, especially in the law and medical faculties, expressed their support for Istczy and petitioned the rector in 1881 against the overrepresentation of Jews. Later that year, a petition from Vasvr in Istczys electoral district called for revoking Jewish emancipation. Istczy received support from Gza nody, Gyula Verhovay, the editor of Fggetlensg (Independence), and Ivn Simonyi, the editor of Westungarischer Grenzbote. But it was the Tiszaeszlr ritual murder accusation and the popular riots it generated throughout the country in 1882 and 1883 that gave Hungarian antisemitism a great boost. In the wake of the Dresden International Conference, Christian defense societies were established throughout the country. Five members of parliament, drawn mainly from the ranks of the left-wing opposition Independence Party, joined Istczys association, some with more moderate, others with more radical anti-Jewish measures in mind.

In October 1883, two months after the conclusion of the Tiszaeszlr trial, the National Antisemitic Party (Orszagos Antiszemita Party) was formed and won 17 seats in parliament and a majority in the municipal council of Pressburg (Bratislava). Internal conflicts led Istczy to leave the party in 1885 to form the National Moderate Antisemitic Party. By the 1887 elections, the combined strength of the two parties had dropped to 11 seats, and many of the leading figures returned to the mainstream. After 1890, attacks against Jews in Hungary came mainly from anticapitalist agrarian associations and clerical circles that formed the conservative Npprt (Peoples Party) in 1895 during the culture wars against the introduction of civil marriage and the reception of Judaism.

In imperial Russia, many right-wing political parties that proclaimed themselves defenders of orthodoxy, autocracy, and the Russian idea appeared after the 1905 Revolution. They drew on a tradition of stereotypic portrayals of Jews as nonproductive exploiters of the peasantry that dated to the late eighteenth century, as well as on a literature embodying traditional Christian anti-Jewish motifs, including ritual murder and the threat of a secret, worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Two prominent examples of that literature were Kniga kagala (Book of the Kahal) by Jacob Brafman (18251879) and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1905). One especially notorious party was Soiuz Russkogo Naroda (the Union of Russian People; URP), also called Chernaia Sotnia (Black Hundred). Founded in 1905, its first leader was Aleksandr I. Dubrovin. The Union established paramilitary groups that engaged in street violence and assassinations and boycotted Jewish shops. Victims included two Jewish deputies representing the liberal Kadet party (Constitutional Democrats, abbreviated KD, hence their common name). Similar to the Union was Russkoe Sobranie (Russian Assembly), a group of high-ranking military and government officials, established in Saint Petersburg in 1900; it became a political party in 1905.

That same year the most powerful and influential right-wing organization, Soiuz Russkich Liudei (Union of Russian People; URP), was established in Moscow. Count P. S. Sheremetev, whose goal was to fight Jewish influence in all fields of Russian life by combining anti-Jewish slogans with populist anticapitalist and antiurban rhetoric, led it. These parties had little electoral success. The controlled, stable, and consistent discriminatory practices of the tsar and the ruling class tended to neutralize the extremist parties, who served more to maintain general hostility against Jews and to perpetuate anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes.

In Congress Poland, antisemitic parties and movements appealed to the proletariat and middle class under a nationalist program of struggle against Jewish competition and Russian oppression. After 1905, especially during elections to the Russian Duma, the Jewish question became highly politicized, with Jews depicted as the main domestic threat to Polish society. In Polish regions beyond the Russian Empire, especially in Galicia, peasant parties included the struggle against the Jewish threat in their agendas. These parties included the Union of Peasants Party (Zwizek Stronnictwa Chopskiego; ZSCh), founded in 1893, and the Christian-Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chrzecijasko-Ludowe), founded in 1896 by Father Stanisaw Stojaowski.

The National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne; ND), known as Endecja, was the most important Polish nationalist party. Founded in 1893 by Roman Dmowski (18641939), it placed the fight against Jews at the center of its program. In accordance with its perception of Germany as Polands main antagonist, it claimed that German and Polish Jews were together spearheading an anti-Polish conspiracy. According to Endecjas main ideologistsDmowski, Jan Popawski (18541908), and Zygmunt Balicki (18581916)Jews were alien to Poland and incorrigibly hostile to Polish national interests; in order to regain independence, ethnic Poles needed to wrest control of trade and industry from them.

Who Is an Antisemite? Russian poster. Printed in the USSR, 19271930. Artwork by Nikolai Denisovski. The poster associates antisemitism with prerevolutionary elements, such as capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and supporters of the tsar. (YIVO)

In Romania, an anti-Jewish political movement emerged against the background of the decision by the Congress of Berlin (1878) to condition recognition of Romanian independence upon emancipation of the countrys Jews. Politicians seized upon this external pressure to arouse an atmosphere of vigilance against the danger of Jewish penetration of Romanias political and social life. Political parties and the press associated the presence of Jews in capitalist enterprises with the countrys critical economic situation. Similarly, the peasants revolt of 1888 and the great peasant uprising of 1907 were accompanied by anti-Jewish propaganda. Especially after 1900, politicians also argued that the Jews integration in Romanian society had to be prevented because it jeopardized the states Romanian national character.

Antisemitic organizations emerged in Romania in conjunction with similar groups in other countries. The Alliance Antijuive Universelle was founded in Bucharest. In 1895, Alexandru C. Cuza (18571947) founded Aliana Antisemit (Antisemitic Alliance) and Liga Antisemit Universal (Universal Antisemitic League). In 1910, he and the historian Nicolae Iorga (18711940) established the Nationalist Democratic Party with an explicitly anti-emancipationist agenda. The new antisemitic groups had significant influence in the press, but except for Cuza no politician had built a political career relying on an exclusively antisemitic agenda. Anti-Jewish themes could also be found in the programs of the main liberal and conservative parties. Several personalities stood out for their violently hostile rhetoric concerning Jews, including Vasile Conta, Vasile Alecsandri, Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, Mihai Eminescu, and Ioan Slavici. These people were later considered forerunners of the radical antisemitic movements that developed after 1918.

The ethnic nationalist parties of the Habsburg and tsarist empires turned increasingly xenophobic upon gaining state power. The Minorities Treaties imposed upon the successor states carved from those empires strengthened right-wing movements by creating a backlash against interference in the internal affairs of the new states. Especially in Poland, Romania, and Hungary, calls to reduce the Jews role in economic and social life became a significant component of interwar nationalism. They were embraced by mainstream parties and taken to extremes by radical nationalist groups. Radical nationalists were politically marginal immediately after World War I, but they eventually succeeded in influencing official policy in a direction inimical to Jewish interests. They attacked liberalism for allowing Jews to prosper economically and reach cultural and intellectual prominence. They also identified Jews with external enemies: the Soviet threat (in Poland and Romania), Hungarian irredentism (in Romania and Slovakia), or Germanization (in Czechoslovakia). Moreover, in Romania and Hungary the military failures of World War I were blamed on Jewish soldiers treacherous and antinational actions. The Bolshevik Revolution and the failed Communist takeover in Hungary under Bla Kun (18861938) further strengthened the stereotype of Judeo-Bolshevism and revived the myth of a Jewish conspiracy for world domination, endowing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion with an aura of prophecy fulfilled.

In Poland, the unrest caused by World War I, and especially the war with Bolshevik Russia, exacerbated anti-Jewish hostility. Local acts of violence took place in Galicia and Lithuania, with the most deadly outbreaks in Lww, Pisk, Lida, and Vilna. Endecja, led by Dmowski, called for de-Judaizing the Polish economy and fighting against the Jews infiltration into Polish national culture. In 1926 Dmowski founded Obz Wielkiej Polski (The Camp of Greater Poland; OWP), which, until its dissolution in 1933, demanded the exclusion of Jews (including converts) from political life.

In 1934, OWP veterans established Obz Narodowo-Radykalny (National Radical Camp; ONR), which envisaged Poland as the Catholic State of the Polish Nation, with Jews eliminated from all fields of activity. It was outlawed because it resorted to violence, particularly against Jews, but it continued to operate clandestinely. In 1934 it split into two factions: ONR-ABC and ONR-Falanga.

ydzi do ghetta! (Jews to the Ghetto!). Polish poster. Printed by Drukarnia i Ksigarnia Sp. z.o.o., Tczew, Poland, 1938. Election poster of Obz Narodowe (National Camp), a right-wing party. The text at bottom reads, Ghettoa closed area where Jews are allowed to live and work until we completely remove them from Poland. In every area of life, we need to delineate a ghetto for them. (YIVO)

Catholicism was an important influence on Endecja and other right-wing nationalist groups, although ideologists of these movements also frequently resorted to racist arguments. After the Nazis took power in Germany (1933) and the death of head of state Jzef Pisudski (1935), such arguments became more pronounced. In 1937 former Pisudski followers established Obz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (The Camp of National Unity; OZN), which portrayed Jews as unassimilable and demanded their mass emigration. Several smaller radical groups, close to the Nazi racist model, also became increasingly active toward the end of the 1930s. These included the Partia Narodowych Socjalistw (Party of National Socialists), Zwizek Nacjonalistw Polskich (Association of Polish Nationalists), Radykalny Ruch Uzdrowienia (Radical Movement for Recovery), and Narodowa Socjalistyczna Partia Robotnicza (National Social Workers Party).

In Romania, hostility toward Jews was exacerbated by their large numbers in territories incorporated into Greater Romania following World War I, including Transylvania, Bessarabia, northern Bucovina, and part of Dobruja. New organizations and political parties emerged aiming to promote the role of ethnic Romanians in the economy and culture and to limit that of Jews, Hungarians, and other minorities. In 1923 Cuza, a member of parliament almost without interruption between 1911 and 1938, established Liga Aprrii Naional Cretine (League of National Christian Defense; LANC). Cuza sought to discredit the Jews participation in the Romanian war effortan important argument in favor of their emancipationwith accusations of treason, desertion, and spying for the enemy. He also called for a numerus clausus to stop the Jews rush into schools and universities. However, pressure from newer antisemitic groups forced him to place even stronger stress on the unity of the race and the Christian religion, as well as on the need for general mobilization to eliminate the enemy. His LANC party sought to revoke Jews political rights, to expel those who had arrived in the country after 1914, and to ban Jews from the army and from public office. From 1921 the swastika was the symbol of Cuzas movement; he claimed a purely Romanian character of this symbol without referring to its use in Germany. One of Cuzas close collaborators, Nicolae C. Paulescu (18691931), was noted for claiming Jews genetic inferiority.

Cuzas increasing racialist radicalism led to a break with his former associate Nicolae Iorga. Iorga argued that Jews needed to be displaced gradually and peacefully from all significant sectors of social life as ethnic Romanians capable of taking their places were trained. Nevertheless, by associating the promotion of Romanian spiritual values with the fight against the Jewish threat, Iorga lent legitimacy to the antisemitic movements and bestowed an aura of patriotic mission on them.

Octavian Goga (18811938), a renowned poet and assiduous advocate of the rights of Romanians from Transylvania, joined Cuza in 1935 to found the Partidul Naional Cretin (National Christian Party). He justified his anti-Jewish attitude on objective grounds: changing demographics following a wave of undesirable intruders from Bessarabia and Bucovina, Transylvanian Jews philoMagyarism, Jews control of the national press, their harmful infiltration of cultural life, and their threat to Romanian ethnic purity. Nevertheless, exposing the spiritual threat posed by Jews became Gogas priority.

In 1927 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, a law student and former disciple of Cuza, founded the fascist movement Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail (Legion of the Archangel Michael), eventually known, after 1930, as Garda de Fier (the Iron Guard). The legion originally brought together students during the struggle for a numerus clausus; later it drew on the lower middle classes. The Iron Guard reached its greatest influence in the 1937 elections with 60 members in parliament, making it the countrys third-largest political party. More than other antisemitic political groups, the Iron Guard stressed Jew equals Communist. The Guard also presented the fight against the Jewish threat as a national mission with a mystical character. Although the Guard had ties to other European fascist movements, it did not claim the Jews racial inferiority and did not adopt the anti-Christian spirit of Nazism.

Dovid Frishman, Briv fun Poyln (Letter from Poland), early 1920s. In this article Frishman writes that it is said that extreme nationalist parties such as Roman Dmowski’s Endecja are being influenced by Romanian-style antisemitism. But actually, Poland has a much more complicated relationship with antisemitism. In Poland, Jews are not hated, they are “despised,” which is much worse. The epithets “Pan Moshek [Little Mister Moyshe] and “Pan Itsek [Little Mister Yitskhok] symbolize this disdain. Today, antisemites in Poland are angry because they are still mired in the world of long ago, whereas Jews have moved on and become modern and are no longer willing to put up with this sort of thing. Today’s Jew will answer back, but watch out: with his son it will be even worse. He’ll hit you or do even more damage. Poland is still today a feudal and ethnocratic society, mired in romanticism while the rest of Europe has moved on. Antisemitism in Poland is not just a matter of “politics,” but also a deep reflection of national psychology.Yiddish. RG 108, Manuscripts Collection, F67.13. (YIVO)

An early prominent supporter of the Guard was Nichifor Crainic (theologian, poet, writer, politician), the main theoretician of the traditionalist and Christian Orthodox antisemitic trends. Philosopher and journalist Nae Ionescus affiliation with the Iron Guard attracted a new generation of intellectuals to the legionary revolution. His disciples followed their master in the spectacular guardist conversion, which began in 1933 and peaked in 19371938. After Codreanus assassination in 1938, Horia Sima took over the leadership of the Guard; he joined general Ion Antonescu in leading the national-legionary state in September 1940. The Iron Guard would play an important part in passing several antisemitic laws and in organizing violent actions against Jews. The climax was the pogrom in Bucharest on 2122 January 1941, during a failed attempt by the Guard to seize power. Antonescu repressed and dissolved the Iron Guard, but many of the former members of the movement were still active in the massacres against the Jewish population ordered by the Antonescu regime during World War II.

In Hungary, territorial losses after World War I led to a feeling of national humiliation and generated a significant increase in the influence of antisemitic political movements, especially after the failure of Bla Kuns revolution. The postrevolutionary right-wing dictatorship began with a period of White Terror (autumn 1919summer 1920), including anti-Jewish massacres. The regime then embarked on a fight against Jewish economic domination. In September 1920, the so-called numerus clausus law made Hungary the first state in interwar Europe to establish quotas on Jews in higher education. Numerous public organizations and professional associations adopted similar agendas. The strongest was the Hungarian Association of National Defense (Magyar Orszgos Vder Egylet; MOVE, established in November 1918); its president was Gyula Gmbs (18861936), a future prime minister.

Radical, xenophobic, and antisemitic right-wing parties that supported revision of the postwar peace settlements dominated the political scene. In November 1924, radical politicians established the Party of Racial Defense (Fajvd Prt), which received four mandates in the 1926 parliamentary elections, but was dissolved by Gmbs in 1928. In October 1925, an international congress of antisemitic parties and groups, dominated by Gmbs, was held in Budapest. Gmbs became prime minister in 1932 and developed his political agenda in the spirit of Nazi racism, although in practice he maintained a relatively moderate attitude toward the Jewish community, and by 1933 distanced himself from Nationalist Socialism. Bla Imrdy formed the government in May 1938, and two weeks later the First Jewish Law was passed, limiting the proportion of Jewish participation in the liberal professions and commercial and industrial businesses to 20 percent. Under the Pl Teleki government, in 1939 the Second Jewish Law was passed, limiting Jewish participation to 6 percent. Jews were defined according to racial criteria; hence the law also governed Jewish converts to Christianity and persons only partially of Jewish origin. The decrees against Jews became harsher with the beginning of the war and the increase of Nazi influence.

The extreme fascist and racist organization, the Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Prt-Hungarista Mozgalom) established by Ferenc Szlasi in 1939, won 31 mandates in that years elections while other allied parties received another 15, a considerable increase over the two they had received in 1935. They formed a united Arrow Cross Party in 1940. Henceforth official policy toward Jews oscillated between the moderate traditional antisemitism of the conservatives (represented by governor Admiral Mikls Horthy and Pl Teleki) and the radical antisemitism represented by Arrow Cross.

In Czechoslovakia, the political atmosphere between the world wars differed from that in neighboring countries. Antisemitic parties existed for the most part only in Slovakia and the Sudetenland. Tom Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, was a firm opponent of efforts to restrict Jewish rights. However, the urban Jewish bourgeoisies preference for German language and culture evoked hostility from Czechs, and several nationalist movements made political capital of this situation. From 1918, Agrarian Party newspapers attacked Jews as pro-German and Bolshevik agents and accused them of having caused postwar social and economic difficulties. Sudeten Germans ensured the electoral success of Konrad Henleins pro-Nazi Sudetendeutsche Partei (Party of Sudeten Germany) in the 1930s.

In Slovakia, hostility was generated by the fact that before World War I Jews had been identified with Hungarian rule. The Slovak Catholic Church tended to favor politicians with nationalist and antisemitic programs. A prominent Slovak nationalist political leader, Vavro robr (18671950), accused the Jews of pro-Magyarism and of Bolshevik convictions. The priest Andrej Hlinka (18641938) established the main antisemitic party, Slovenska Ludova Strana (Slovak People’s Party), in 1925. Xenophobic nationalism with a strong Catholic component, also espoused by Hlinkas successor, the theologian Jozef Tiso, became a dominant feature of the party. The fascist militia set up by this party in 1938, the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkov Garda), actively participated in the deportation of Jews to Nazi killing centers.

In the context of the Soviet Union and its satellite states where formal political parties or movements were officially illegal, this discussion is concerned less with parties and organizations than with state antisemitism. The parameters for anti-Jewish political activity under Communist regimes were set in the USSR following the Bolshevik revolution. Soviet law forbade public expressions of antisemitism and antisemitic political activity. During the first years of Soviet rule, a large number of Jewish Bolsheviks took leading positions in the party and state hierarchies. After Lenins death (1924), Joseph Stalins struggle against his political rival, Leon Trotsky, became increasingly marked by anti-Jewish expressions, and the accusation of Trotskyism was used in the 1930s to eliminate many Jewish Bolshevik leaders, intellectuals, and artists, as well as to de-Judaize the higher ranks of the party, military, and state hierarchies.

After World War II, Stalinist policy became increasingly hostile to Jews, with the most important campaigns taking place under the slogan of struggle against American imperialism, Zionism, cosmopolitanism, and economic sabotage. Jewish access to higher education and public office was limited. Members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were tried and executed, and in early 1953 several prominent Jewish doctors were accused of plotting to poison Soviet leaders. After Stalins death, the Soviet regime systematically prevented calling attention to the particular tragedy of the Jewish population during World War II.

Less intense discrimination continued during the regimes of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev in the 1960s and 1970s, generally under the slogans of the struggle against Zionism and the State of Israel. It was only with Mikhail Gorbachevs liberalization in the late 1980s that the first antisemitic organizations surfaced in the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, glasnost favored the emergence of numerous right-wing Russian nationalist groups with xenophobic agendas, supported also by renowned intellectuals (such as the mathematician Igor Shafarevich) and by cultural journals such as Nash sovremennik (Our Contemporary), Molodaya gvardiya (Young Guard), and others. During the early 1980s, the nationalist antisemitic organization Pamiat (Memory) was established; in 1987 it was transformed into the National-Patriotic Front (NPF), led by Dmitrii Vasilev.

The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, especially during the Stalinist period, followed a direction similar to the one enforced by the Kremlin leaders, with variations from country to country. The new regimes inaugurated a radical change in the situation of Jews who had survived the Holocaust: Jews who were devoted to the regime penetrated the political hierarchy of the country, acquiring power and privileges. However, these Jews soon became victims of purges within the party and of show trials in the 1950s, together with numerous imprisoned Zionist activists. The Communist parties in Eastern Europe thus created a new Jewish question, officially condemning antisemitism but disguising it in practice under the rhetorical cover of a fight against Zionism and bourgeois nationalism. The former slogan Jew equals Communist was replaced by Jew equals Zionist. In the popular imagination, however, the identification of Jews with the new Communist regimes persisted.

In Czechoslovakia, official antisemitism surfaced before and during the show trial of the former Communist leader Rudolf Slnsk (19501952). He was sentenced to death together with 10 other Communist leaders (all but three of Jewish origin), accused of espionage, Zionism, and Titoism. The anti-Zionist diversion was used again to compromise and annihilate the liberalization movement of the party in 1968.

Poland, under Wadysaw Gomukas leadership, experienced a first wave of official antisemitism in 1956. A second wave in 19671968 was marked by attacks upon Jews unprecedented under Communist rule, followed by massive purges and a new exodus of Jews from Poland. Several party leaders made overt use of anti-Jewish rhetoric, especially the group led by the nationalist Mieczysaw Moczar. In the 1980s, after the emergence of the free trade union movement Solidarno (Solidarity), the regime attempted, unsuccessfully, to compromise several leaders of the movement by tendentiously revealing their (real or imaginary) Jewish origins.

In Hungary, after an initial postwar surge of rhetoric hostile to Jews, which culminated with Lszl Rajks trial (1949), the government that took power after the repression of the 1956 uprising, led by Jnos Kdr, kept antisemitic outbursts under control. However, it consistently pursued an anti-Israeli policy.

In Romania, Ana Paukers overthrow in 1952 was prepared based on an investigation with many antisemitic features, but it concluded without a trial or an ostentatious anti-Zionist campaign. Party leaders sought to implement a Romanianization of the higher ranks. A significant change occurred in the 1960s, especially under Nicolae Ceauescus leadership. Essentially xenophobic, Ceauescus national ideology regarded Jewish emigration as the most convenient way to improve the ethnic structure of the population and to insure that ethnic Romanians held positions of authority. Ceauescu avoided Soviet-type anti-Zionist propaganda, however, and maintained good relations with the state of Israel; but at the same time he allowed and sometimes encouraged attacks upon Jews in the party-controlled press.

With the fall of the East European Communist regimes and the dismemberment of the USSR, the disappearance of controlled or official antisemitism was followed by the privatization of antisemitism and the emergence of numerous, often ephemeral, political groups with an anti-Jewish orientation. The new extreme right-wing parties emerging in Eastern Europe revived the heritage of the radical antisemitic parties of the period between the two world wars, including use of the same party names and resumption of the political agenda and ideology of such parties.

In the Russian Federation, one of Pamiats leaders, Aleksandr Barkashov, withdrew in 1990 and established the Russkoe Natsionalnoe Edinstvo (Russian National Unity; RNE), supported by several nationalist members of the Duma. Oleg Kasin replaced Barkashov in 2000. There were about 30 similar organizations in the late 1990s. Except for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, these groups did not have significant success in elections, although they succeeded in fostering latent anti-Jewish feelings and occasional violent outbursts. The National Patriots, led by Sergei Baburin, stood out among such groups. In 2003, Rodina (Motherland), a bloc of nationalist and left-wing populist parties led by Dmitrii Rogozin and Sergei Glazev and including Sergei Baburins Narodnaya Volya (Peoples Will) party, obtained 28 percent of the seats in the Duma. Some of these organizations enjoyed the sympathy and support of Orthodox church leaders. Gennadii Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, also overtly adopted anti-Jewish slogans. Another national Bolshevik party was established by the writer Eduard Limonov. While encouraging Russian nationalism but repeatedly accusing others of antisemitism, Vladimir Putins authoritarian regime neutralized to a certain extent the influence of the antisemitic organizations and parties that emerged in the 1990s, though it took no legal action against them.

While not as prominent as in the Russian Federation, antisemitic rhetoric reemerged in Ukraine in the post-Communist period. Extremist groups supporting Ukrainian ethnocracy took to identifying Jews with Western democracy, which had allegedly caused economic and political deadlock. The most influential such organization was a bloc of extremist parties united in the Ukrainian National Assembly (Ukrainska Natsionalna Asambleia; UNA), with a paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian Self-Defense (Ukrainska Natsionalna Samooborona; UNSO). The party ideology, expressed by one of its leaders, Dmytro Korchinskii, was a mix of pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. Other groups with a similar political profile included the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv; OUN), the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (Ukrainska Konservatyvna Respublikanska Partiia; UKRP), and the Ukrainian Social-Nationalist Party (Sotsial-Natsionalna Partiia Ukrainy; SNPU). Derzhavna Samostiynist Ukrainy (State Independence of Ukraine; DSU), established in Lviv in 1990, is another extreme right-wing organization. In many cases, the ideological antisemitism of such groups is a component of a xenophobic messianic doctrine according to which Jews are leading participants in an anti-Ukrainian conspiracy. The influence of such parties was negligible in electoral polling; only 23 percent of respondents defined themselves as ultranationalists hostile to Jews. In the absence of significant parliamentary representation, such parties focused on publishing leaflets and magazines hostile to Jews.

The situation in Belarus is more serious than in other former Soviet republics. Under Aleksandr Lukashenkos dictatorial regime several active extremist organizations have operated, though their membership and political support are limited. Some of them have a clear Nazi and racist orientation and operate illegally. Such organizations include Rus, led by Gennadii Vlasov, and the Belarus Peoples Patriot Movement (NPDB), led by Viktor Chikin. There are also branches of Russian extremist organizations, such as the Belarus National Bolsheviks, led by Viktor Gordeev, a subsidiary of Eduard Limonovs party and a subsidiary of the Russian National Unity (RNE), led by Andrei Sakovich.

Radical groups in the Baltic States set as their main objective the consolidation of national identity, aiming to combat the heritage of the Soviet period and the effects of forced Russification. Ethnic tensions were more pronounced in relation to Russian and Polish minorities than to Jews. Anti-Jewish attitudes and statements arose mainly in connection with public discussion of the Jews participation in the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the Baltic region. The most sensitive issue was the debate on the participation of the local population in Nazi massacres during the Holocaust and the rehabilitation of war criminals, including veterans of SS divisions in Latvia. Several radical extremist parties were represented in the Latvian parliament, including For the Fatherland and Freedom (Tevzemei un Brivibai; TB), and Peoples Movement for Latvia (Tautas Kustiba Latvijai, Zigerist Partija). Certain generally illegal branches of various extremist parties from the Russian Federation, such as the pro-Nazi party Russian National Unity (RNE), became extremely active within Russian minority circles in the Baltic States. A party that had been active in the interwar years was reestablished in Lithuaniathe Lithuanian Nationalist Party Young Lithuania (Lietuviu Nacionaline Partija Jaunoji Lietuva); it received 4 percent of the vote in 1996. It is led by Stanislovas Buskevicius, a xenophobic extreme nationalist politician, and a declared opponent of Jewish influence.

In Poland, the presidential election campaign was the first significant political arena in which anti-Jewish motifs appeared after the fall of communism. Some leaders of the Solidarno Party attributed an imaginary Jewish ancestry to other candidates. Emerging nationalist political groups rediscovered and exploited the spirit of Dmowskis Endecja. Dmowski himself was rehabilitated and celebrated as one of the main ideologists of Polish nationalism. The most dynamic antisemitic organization is Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland; NOP) led by Adam Gmurczyk, which claims to be the heir of ONR and includes groups of skinheads. Other active organizations, though less influential, are Zwizek Biaego Ora (White Eagle Union; ZBO); Polska Wsplnota NarodowaPolskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (Polish National CommunityPolish National Party), led by the former Marxist Bolesaw Tejkowski; and Modzie Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth), led by Roman Giertych, who since 2006 has been Polands minister of education. Another revived organization is Stronnictwo Narodowe (following Endecjas model).

Traditional Catholic hostility toward Jews continues in extremist political discourse in Poland. A remarkable political force is Radio Maryja, which is extremely popular and propounds a mix of Catholic messages with nationalist, anti-Jewish, and xenophobic populism. On the other hand, in liberal Catholic intellectual and clerical circles, especially those surrounding the periodicals Tygodnik Powszechny, Wi, and Znak, a strong, though minority, liberal group has emerged that is active in fighting antisemitism.

In Poland, tensions related to Holocaust memory are linked to frustration on the part of some Poles who maintain that their suffering under Nazi occupation is not sufficiently acknowledged in the West. Recent historical studies highlighting the massacre of Jews by Poles at Jedwabne in 1941 and pogroms in Poland during the first years after the war led to heated debates and to significant anti-Jewish reactions in the press. However, a number of intellectuals and politiciansJan Bonski, Jacek Kuro, Jan Jzef Lipski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Maria Janion, and former president Aleksander Kwaniewskihave consistently condemned antisemitism and assumed moral responsibility for crimes committed by Poles or for the indifference of the majority to the fate of Jews at the hands of the Nazis.

In Slovakia, nationalist parties and organizations are concerned with exonerating and rehabilitating the image of Jozef Tiso, who is represented as a savior of the Jews. They also minimize the Slovak authorities participation in the deportation of Jews to Nazi killing centers. Among such groups, the most powerful are Slovenska Narodna Strana (Slovak National Party; SNS) and the Matica Slovenska nationalist organization and cultural foundation. Their propaganda also claims a Zionist conspiracy against Slovakia. Other marginal extremist parties are the Slovak Peoples Party (SLS) and Slovenska Pospolitost (Slovak Community), which also includes skinhead groups.

In Romania, Partidul Romnia Mare (Great Romania Party; PRM), the first extremist party to emerge after the fall of Ceauescus dictatorship, was also the most aggressive propagator of xenophobia and antisemitism. This party, which became the third-largest political party in Romania, sought to rehabilitate Antonescus regime, denied the Holocaust, and claimed a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Its newspaper, Romnia Mare, mixed anti-Jewish rhetoric with no less hostile statements against Hungarians and the Roma. Other extremist political organizations with a more limited pool of voters, founded in the early 1990s, claimed affiliation to the tradition of the Iron Guard: Micarea pentru Romnia (Movement for Romania; MFR), led by Marian Munteanu; the Party of National Right (PNR) led by Radu Sorescu; the ultranationalist cultural foundation Vatra Romneasc (Romanian Cradle), led by Ion Coja, one of the main ideologists of conspiratorial antisemitism; and erban Surus Legionary Movement.

In the 1994 elections in Hungary, extremist parties with a strong antisemitic agenda did not gain more than 1.6 percent of the votes, but one of the governing coalition parties (Hungarian Democratic Forum; MDF) disseminated antisemitic slogans and denied the Holocaust. It was mainly after the 1998 elections that the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), formed by Istvn Csurka in 1993, brought antisemitic and xenophobic rhetoric to parliament. Small neo-Nazi groups, such as the Hungarian Peoples Welfare Association (MNSZ), operate in the spirit of the Arrow Cross. The main topics of antisemitic political discourse concern the responsibility of the Hungarian authorities during the Holocaust and the purported world domination of the Jews. Such topics appeared in the periodicals Szent Korona and Hunia Fzetek.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many East European intellectuals see antisemitic rhetoric as a form of moral dissolution and a belated effect of the later stages of the Communist age and of the confusion caused by the abrupt changes that occurred after the fall of the Communist regimes. Vulgar antisemitism could be thus included among the symptoms of moral crisis. The intellectuals who commit themselves to fighting against such phenomena, those who suggest critical rethinking of issues from the past, and those who oppose populist slogans and nationalist demagogy, often end up being labeled as Jews.

Shmuel Almog, Nationalism and Antisemitism in Modern Europe, 18151945 (Oxford and New York, 1990); Yehuda Bauer, ed., Present-Day Antisemitism (Jerusalem, 1988); Jean-Yves Camus, Les extrmismes en Europe: tat des lieux en 1998 (Paris, 1998); Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe (New York, 1993); Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 17001933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); Andrs Kovcs, Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary (Jerusalem, 1999); Paul Lendvai, Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe (New York, 1971); Leon Poliakov, The History of Antisemitism, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 2003); Dina Porat and Roni Stauber, eds., Antisemitism Worldwide, 2000/1 (Lincoln, Nebr., 2002); Peter G.J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, rev. ed. (London, 1988); Michael Shafir, Between Denial and Comparative Trivialization: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe (Jerusalem, 2002); Leon Volovici, Antisemitism in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: A Marginal or Central Issue? (Jerusalem, 1994); Robert Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (London, 1991).

HUNGARY: Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, rev. and enl. ed., 2 vols. (New York and Boulder, 1994); Rolf Fischer, Entwicklungsstufen des Antisemitismus in Ungarn, 18671939: Die Zerstrung der magyarisch-jdischen Symbiose (Munich, 1988); Andrew Handler, An Early Blueprint for Zionism: Gyz Istczys Political Anti-Semitism (Boulder and New York, 1989); Nathaniel Katzburg, Antishemiyut be-Hungaryah, 18671944 (Jerusalem, 1992).

POLAND: Olaf Bergmann, Narodowa Demokracja wobec problematyki ydowskiej w latach 19181929 (Pozna, Pol., 1998); Stephen David Corrsin, Warsaw before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 18801914 (Boulder and New York, 1989); Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (Princeton, 2006); Israel Gutman et al., eds., The Jews of Poland between Two World Wars (Hanover, N.H., 1989); Jerzy Holzer, Polish Political Parties and Antisemitism, Polin 8 (1994): 194205; Anna Landau-Czajka, The Ubiquitous Enemy: The Jew in the Political Thought of Radical Right-Wing Nationalists in Poland, 19261939, Polin 4 (1989) 169203; Jacek Maria Maj- chrowski, Szkice z historii polskiej prawicy politycznej lat Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Krakw, 1986); Joanna Michlic, Polands Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present (Lincoln, Nebr., and London, 2006); Szymon Rudnicki, Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny: Geneza i dziaalno (Warsaw, 1985); Jerzy Tomaszewski, Zarys dziejw ydw w Polsce w latach 19181939 (Warsaw, 1990).

ROMANIA: Armin Heinen, Die Legion Erzengel Michael in Rumnien (Munich, 1986); Carol Iancu, Jews in Romania, 18661919 (Boulder and New York, 1996); Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 19181930 (Ithaca and London, 1995); William O. Oldson, A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania (Philadelphia, 1991); Michael Shafir, The Inheritors: The Romanian Radical Right since 1989, East European Jewish Affairs 24.1 (Summer 1994): 7189; Leon Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s (Oxford and New York, 1991).

RUSSIA: John D. Klier, Imperial Russias Jewish Question, 18551881 (Cambridge and New York, 1995); John D. Klier, The Dog That Didnt Bark: Anti-Semitism in Post-Communist Russia, in Russian Nationalism: Past and Present, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, pp.129147 (Basingstoke, Eng., 1998); William Korey, Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism (Chur, Switz., 1995); Matthias Messmer, Sowjetischer und postkommunistischer Antisemitismus: Entwicklungen in Russland, der Ukraine und Litauen (Konstanz, Ger., 1997); Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley, 1986); Vadim Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism in the Post-Communist Era (Lincoln, Nebr., 2002); Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Vladimir Pribylovskii, Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii: Istoriia, ideologiia, ekstremistskie tendentsii (Moscow, 1996).

SLOVAKIA: Yeshayahu Andrej Jelinek, The Parish Republic: Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party, 19391945 (Boulder, 1976); Ladislav Lipscher, Die Juden im slowakischen Staat, 19391945 (Munich, 1980); Pavol Metan, Antisemitism in Slovak Politics, 19891999 (Bratislava, 2000).

UKRAINE: Liudmila Dymerskaya-Tsigelman and Leonid Finberg, Antisemitism of the Ukrainian Radical Nationalists: Ideology and Policy (Jerusalem, 1999).

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Nazi Germany and Anti-Jewish Policy | ADL

Anti-Jewish Policy by Year1933

Between 1933 and 1938, nearly 150,000 Jews managed to leave Nazi Germany. This number represented approximately 30 percent of the total Jewish population. In order for Jews to legally emigrate from Germany, they were required to have both German passports and visas permitting them to enter another country. Most countries however, had quotas that limited the number of immigrants allowed to enter and required that those entering were able to support themselves. Very few countries admitted German-Jewish refugees, and after the Kristallnacht Pogrom, it became extremely difficult for Jews to leave Germany. Most of the Jews who fled Germany went to other European countries that were occupied by the Nazis months or a few years later.

Adapted with permission from Echoes and Reflections. 2005 Anti-Defamation League, USC Shoah Foundation, Yad Vashem, www.echoesandreflections.org. All rights reserved.

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The Nazis & the Jews – Jewish Virtual Library

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Britain’s last anti-Jewish riots – New Statesman | Britain …

In 1947 a washed-out summer had followed a harsh winter, and Britain was in the grip of recession as it struggled to restart its economy after the Second World War. On the August bank holiday weekend, the weather in Manchester had turned hot and stuffy. Trade in the shops was poor, rationing was in full swing and many workers had opted to stay in the city for the long weekend.

In cinema queues and on street corners, one topic dominated the conversation: the murder of two British army sergeants by Irgun paramilitaries in Mandate Palestine. The Irgun was one of several Zionist groups fighting a guerrilla war to force British troops out of the territory and establish the state of Israel. It had kidnapped the two sergeants in retaliation for death sentences passed on three of its own fighters. The three men were executed by British forces on 29 July, and two days later the bodies of the soldiers were discovered amid the trees of a eucalyptus grove near Netanya. They had been hanged and the ground beneath them booby-trapped with a landmine.

It was just one incident of many in a vicious conflict. Militants had bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem a year previously, and even set off small bombs in London. But the sergeants affair, as it came to be known, caused public outrage in mainland Britain.

On 1 August, a Friday, the Daily Express reported the story on its front page, prominently displaying a photograph of the bodies which, it promised its readers, would be a picture that will shock the world. British Jewish leaders condemned the killings, but more lurid details followed in the next days papers. That weekend, as Walter Lever, a working-class Jewish resident of Manchester recalled, There was nothing to do but walk the streets . . . discussing the newspaper, the story of the hanged sergeants taking precedence over the weeks murders and rapes.

There were already signs that a backlash was imminent. In Birkenhead, near Liverpool, slaughterhouse workers had refused to process any more meat for Jewish consumption until the attacks on British soldiers in Palestine stopped. Around Merseyside, the anger was starting to spill on to the streets as crowds of angry young men gathered in Jewish areas.

On Sunday afternoon the trouble reached Manchester. Small groups of men began breaking the windows of shops in Cheetham Hill, an area just north of the city centre which had been home to a Jewish community since the early 19th century. The pubs closed early that day because there was a shortage of beer, and by the evening the mobs numbers had swelled to several hundred. Most were on foot but others drove through the area, throwing bricks from moving cars.

Soon the streets were covered in broken glass and stones and the crowd moved on to bigger targets, tearing down the canopy of the Great Synagogue on Cheetham Hill Road and surrounding a Jewish wedding party at the Assembly Hall. They shouted abuse at the terrified guests until one in the morning.

The next day, Lever said, Cheetham Hill Road looked much as it had looked seven years before, when the German bombers had pounded the city for 12 hours. All premises belonging to Jews for the length of a mile down the street had gaping windows and the pavements were littered with glass.

By the end of the bank holiday weekend, anti-Jewish riots had also taken place in Glasgow and Liverpool. There were minor disturbances, too, in Bristol, Hull, London and Warrington, as well as scores of attacks on Jewish property across the country. A solicitor in Liverpool and a Glasgow shopkeeper were beaten up. Nobody was killed, but this was the most widespread anti-Jewish violence the UK had ever seen. In Salford, the day after a crowd of several thousand had thrown stones at shop windows, signs appeared that read: Hold your fire. These premises are British.

Arsonists in West Derby set fire to a wooden synagogue; workers at Canada Dock in Liverpool returned from the holidays to find Death to all Jews painted above the entrance. And in Eccles, a former sergeant major named John Regan was fined 15 for telling a crowd of 700: Hitler was right. Exterminate every Jew every man, woman and child. What are you afraid of? Theres only a handful of police.

Just two years after British troops had liberated Bergen-Belsen, the language of the Third Reich had resurfaced, this time at home. Anger about what had happened in Palestine was one thing, but it seemed to have unleashed something far more vicious.

Whitechapel, London, 2012. I am waiting outside the library a glassy new building just up the high street from the Victorian edifice where a generation of self-educated Jewish intellectuals and artists congregated in the early years of the 20th century to meet Max Levitas. Its a Thursday afternoon and I have interrupted his weekly ritual: a trip to the Turkish bath in Bethnal Green, a walk that Levitas still makes, alone, at the age of 97.

Born in Dublin in 1915 to Jewish refugee parents from the Baltic, Levitas has lived in Whitechapel since 1930. In 1947 when the rioting erupted, he was a local councillor and member of the Communist Party. Although London was spared riots on the scale of those in the north, he recalls how the hanging sergeants incident compounded animosity towards Jews in the East End. I opposed the hanging when I spoke at meetings, but the main fight was dealing with racism that foreigners were getting jobs and Jews were getting jobs.

This was one sign that the anti-Jewish feeling had a deeper source than any act of terrorism in the Middle East. Postwar austerity was at its harshest. Contrary to the cheery Keep Calm and Carry On nostalgia with which the period is recalled today, it was a time of hunger and poverty. A fuel shortage during the winter of 1946-47 had led to soaring unemployment; in the spring of 1947 it peaked at 1.9 million. Hopes that anti-Semitism, which had re-emerged during previous economic downturns, would have disappeared with the defeat of Hitler were short-lived. Instead, as the historian Tony Kushner has written in an essay on the links between austerity and the 1947 riots, a popular stereotype persisted of Jews as black marketeers gaining from the war but not contributing to the effort. The extension of rationing kept the stereotype alive. Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary, had made remarks about the Jews of Europe pushing to the front of the queue and during the fuel crisis he made a quip about Israelites, insinuating that Jewish black marketeers were hoarding fuel. Worse still, Jewish loyalty over Palestine was being questioned openly. In the opening days of 1947 the Sunday Times had addressed an editorial to British Jews in which the paper accused them of failing to perform their civic duty and moral obligations by denouncing the anti-British violence in Palestine.

In Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester, where the worst rioting took place, the downturn was at its most painful. These cities had the highest levels of unemployment in Britain and even though the disturbances initially targeted the Jews they quickly progressed to generalised looting. Get the Jews, get the stuff and get into the shops, was one shout heard in Manchester. Not for the first (or last) time, racism and economic exclusion combined and formed a poisonous resentment.

Levitas had been part of the crowd that faced down Oswald Mosleys Blackshirts on Cable Street in the East End in October 1936. Like many trade unionists, he was alarmed at the resurgence of violence. There was a feeling that wed just had a war against fascism, and that wed got to ensure that the fascists didnt do again what they did in the Thirties.

Although the violence in 1947 was not orchestrated by fascist political parties, it emboldened the remaining adherents. Jeffrey Hamm, a former member of the British Union of Fascists who was now in charge of the League of Ex-Servicemen, visited the north-west of England and attempted to stir up trouble. Fascists displayed copies of the Daily Expresss hanging sergeants front page at their meetings. And in 1948 Oswald Mosley, who had been interned in Holloway Prison during the war, launched a new party, the Union Movement.

At the end of the war, 43 Jewish ex-servicemen had set up a clandestine group to infiltrate fascist meetings and break up their opponents rallies by fighting in the street. The 43 Group was the first of several such organisations. Levitas believes that one reason the fascists were kept at bay, and why east London stayed relatively calm through the late 1940s, is that the lessons of the 1930s had been learned.

Only through the integration of society could we play a major part in stopping racism, he told me. For him, this integration went beyond anti-fascist protest; it involved people demanding for themselves jobs, housing and education for their kids. To ensure that whatever religion youve got, whatever your colour, you play a part in society.

On 5 August, four days after its sensationalised coverage had triggered the riots, the Express appealed for calm. No more of this! it implored readers, arguing that the attacks on innocent shopkeepers had become a national disgrace. In Manchester, the violence had subsided, leaving an ugly atmosphere. For the rest of the week, Lever recalled, one overheard behind one in the bus, over ones shoulder at the next caf table,a row ahead in the cinema, whispering anecdotes and muttered abuse relating to the events of the Sunday night.

A dividing line had been drawn through daily life where none appeared to exist before. Rachel Barash, who had worked for the Jewish hospitality committee that brought refugee children over from Germany and the Netherlands during the 1930s, remembered how the riots sparkeda nasty stand-off between boys from rival youth clubs. Until that point, the refugees, who were housed in the suburban village of Withington, had been welcomed and treated as our children by their neighbours. Now Jewish boys across Manchester gathered together, ready to defend themselves.

Yet the tension dissipated almost as quickly as violence had surged: in the words of another Manchester resident, Agnes Sussman, It all passed over as if nothing had happened. Today, there is little mention of the riots in the official histories. There are only a couple of academic essays beyond Kushner’s study, and the violence in Liverpool forms a backdrop to the play Three Sisters on Hope Street, the 2008 retelling of Chekhov by Diane Samuels and Tracy-Ann Oberman. Elsewhere, they are viewed as an insignificant footnote to the story of the creation of the state of Israel.

Why have the riots been forgotten? According to Dave Rich, deputy director of communications at the Community Security Trust, a charity established in 1994 to ensure the safety and security of British Jews, one reason was that there were much bigger things to worry about then. The full horrors of the Holocaust were still coming to light; efforts to establish the state of Israel were ongoing; and in Britain, for Zionist and non-Zionist Jews alike, there were more pressing economic concerns. Given that few people were actually hurt in the riots, Rich says, its understandable that, in the wider picture of what is on the mind of Jews at that time, it would very quickly get relegated.

British politicians, too, were keen to sweep things under the carpet. James Chuter Ede, the postwar home secretary, dismissed the rioting as mere hooliganism . . . rather than an indication of public feeling, while magistrates condemned rioters as un-British and unpatriotic. Nations need their feel-good stories and as Rich points out, The thought that those popular anti-Jewish riots could happen two years after the Holocaust in Britain . . . runs counter to the anti-fascist mythology of Britains role in the war. Who wants to go digging that up?

Yet the riots were neither an aberration nor the product of an unruly working class. Britain was experiencing an identity crisis: it had won the war but appeared to be losing the peace, with recession at home and the break-up of its empire abroad, in which the events in Mandate Palestine played only a small part. As colonised peoples increasingly demanded independence, Britain turned to a more inward-looking nationalism. Along with it came the question of who would be included and who would be left out.

In 1948, with cross-party support, the Labour government passed the British Nationality Act, marking a shift from a situation where all those living in the empire in theory, although quite evidently not in practice were equal subjects under the Crown to one where each country in the Commonwealth could determine its own version of citizenship. Although in the years to come it would be non-whiteimmigrants from the Commonwealth who would most strongly challenge received notions of Englishness and Britishness and who would bear the brunt of racism, Jews, too, were caught up in this, for a brief period.

There is one other reason why this episode is worth remembering. On the face of it, there are striking similarities with the way modern Britain has responded to Islamist-inspired terror. Now, as then, events in the Middle East have violent repercussions on Britains streets. Home-grown terrorists have set off bombs in London; tabloid newspapers give sensationalist coverage to attacks on our boys fighting abroad and question the loyalty of British people of a different faith, this time Muslims. This in turn has provoked an angry backlash in the form of the far-right English Defence League.

At the same time, integration is a demand made of outsiders to adopt our values, to become more like us. In doing so, some of todays integrationists hold up British Jews as a kind of model community. In 2006 at a ceremony to commemorate the 350th anniversary of Cromwells readmission of the Jews into England, Tony Blair told a congregation at Bevis Marks Synagogue: As the oldest minority faith community in this country, you show how identity through faith can be combined with a deep loyalty to our nation. Less was said about how we arrived at this point.

Yet it is best to see the events of 1947 as the end of a chapter rather than the beginning of one. A year later, the state of Israel was formed and Chaim Weizmann, who had lived and worked in Manchester, was appointed as its first president. Britains duplicitous conduct towards Jews and Arabs since it had taken control of Palestine in 1920, the dispossession of the Palestinians and the nasty guerrilla war were events that it suited both sides to pretend had never happened. Relations were soon normalised and nobody cared to recall the brief moment when the messy end to a colonial misadventure was played out on British streets.

Today Cheetham Hill, the old Jewish quarter of Manchester, is home to people of many faiths and none. Most of the old buildings were knocked down in the 1970s and one ornate former synagogue is now a clothing warehouse, its stained-glass Star of David window cracked and boarded up. But this is no cause for mourning; many Jews simply moved further up the road, taking their places of worship with them. At least 35,000 still live in Manchester, which has the largest Jewish population in the UK outside London. The sergeants affair is a fading memory, snatches of which are preserved on a handful of reel-to-reel recordings in local history archives. Yet somewhere amid the ghostly swirl of recollections, a painful irony remains: one of the murdered soldiers, Clifford Martin, was Jewish.

Thanks to the Manchester Jewish Museum

Tony Kushner’s essay “Anti-Semitism and austerity: the August 1947 riots in Britain” is published in Panikos Panayi (ed.), “Racial Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” (Leicester University Press, 1996)

Daniel Trillings Bloody Nasty People: the Rise of Britains Far Right will be published by Verso in September. Follow him on Twitter @trillingual

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Teenage Sisters Singing: Neo-Nazi Beliefs Have Changed as …

Published on Jul 20, 2011

Two girls who used to play in a neo-Nazi band explain what drove them to change. For more, click here: http://abcn.ws/r7EnGP Watch Full Episode of GMA: http://abcn.ws/q1OJPj

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VIDEO: Watch Former NHL Great Jeremy Roenick Capture Rattlesnake with Two Golf Clubs


Former Chicago Blackhawk great Jeremy Roenick was not only the king of the ice, he appears to have a future as a snake tamer. A video has surfaced showing Roenick capturing a dangerous rattlesnake using only two golf clubs.

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Terry Glenn: Former New England Patriots WR Dies in Car Wreck


Nov. 20 (UPI) — Longtime New England Patriots wide receiver Terry Glenn died in a car accident Monday morning. He was 43-years-old.

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FS1’s Sharpe Sides with Trump, Slams LaVar Ball for Being Ungrateful


Monday on Fox Sports 1’s “Undisputed,” host Shannon Sharpe sided with President Donald Trump after the president lamented working with Chinese government to get three UCLA basketball players released after they were detained on shoplifting charges because LaVar Ball, the father of one of the players, acted like Trump played no role in his son’s release. “Who?” Ball responded when he was asked by ESPN about Trump’s involvement in his son’s release. Sharpe said even people who dislike Trump would agree with him in his feud with Ball. “I can assure you even the people that dislike President Trump the most would agree that LaVar Ball is wrong in this situation. I guarantee you that,” Sharpe told co-host Skip Bayless. “Now, you might dislike what he’s done, what he’s said and who he is, but he had some effect on these kids coming home.” Sharpe then said that if Ball’s “kleptomaniac son” would not have been taking stuff in China, this conversation would not be happening. “If your son would have kept his sticky ass fingers in his pockets and not take people’s stuff in China, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. So, you talk about ‘who?’ — your kleptomaniac son is who!” he exclaimed. Follow Trent Baker on Twitter @MagnifiTrent

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Sharansky warns of building ties with pro-Israel …

Natan Sharansky . (photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM/THE JERUSALEM POST) Far-right European political groups that profess to love Israel often hold antisemitic views, Jewish Agency Chairman Natan Sharansky warned on Tuesday. In an address in Jerusalem to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Sharansky asserted that there is a growing phenomenon of political groups on the Right in Europe returning to their Nazi pasts, while supporting Israel for its stand against Islamic extremism. But we should not fall into the trap, he said. Sharansky noted that Jews have become accustomed to left-wing groups who were vocally anti-Israel emphasizing positive feelings toward Jews. For many years we have been used to dealing with organizations, countries and public figures who keep saying they love Jews, but hate Israel, he said. Today, in addition to this, he explained, we are seeing the reverse phenomenon. Those who love Israel and hate Jews and those who hate Israel and love Jews are not our partners, he affirmed. Actually, what should happen is that voices on the Right should fight antisemitism on the Right, and voices on the Left should fight antisemitism on the Left. It usually goes the other way, and its not a successful strategy, he noted. But assimilation, in Sharanskys eyes, is the biggest problem for the Jewish world. Im told only 12% of American Jews go to Jewish schools, he said, expressing concern that not enough US Jewish children are attending such schools, learning Hebrew, learning about Zionism and learning about Israel. The number-one problem is the issue of assimilation in the American Jewish community. If we are not ready to defend and build our identity, no one will do it for us, he told the audience. My aim is to build bridges between Israel and the Jewish people, he said, and spoke of the unique history of the Jewish Agency, which developed a very paternalistic approach toward the Jewish people. Sharansky said, however, that he believed there was a new relationship between Israel and the Jewish communities of the Diaspora, and that he did not want Jews to view Israel just as a place of shelter. Israel is a unique country for Jews with quality and free Jewish life, he stressed. Today, all over the world, youre all part of the same team. The fact that this roundtable of Jewish agencies is having a dialogue, this is a great achievement.Sharansky is stepping down from the helm of the Jewish Agency in June. Im finishing nine years in the Jewish Agency after nine years in a Soviet prison. They asked me to stay longer, and I said I cant add more time to the time I served in prison, quipped Sharansky, referring to the time he spent imprisoned as a Soviet refusenik in the 1970s and 80s. Share on facebook

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YIVO | Antisemitic Parties and Movements

Political groups seeking to limit the role of Jews in Central and East European states and societies emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century against the background of economic crisis, ethnic and political tensions, reaction to Jewish emancipation, and the increasing prominence of Jews in economic and cultural life. Such groups appeared first in Germany around 1880 and, shortly thereafter, in Austria-Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Russian pogroms of 18811882 and the ritual murder accusations in Tiszaeszlr, Hungary (18821883), helped strengthen the so-called antisemitic movement in Central and Eastern Europe. At the first International Anti-Jewish Congress, held in Dresden in 1882, a picture of Eszter Solymosi, the victim of Tiszaeszlr, was prominently displayed, and among the Congresss delegates were three members of the Hungarian parliament. An Alliance Antijuive Universelle was established in 1886. Different circumstances governed the evolution and success of anti-emancipationist groups in different countries. In the Habsburg Empire, the emerging national movements often perceived Jews as agents of the dominant German culture and instruments of imperial authority. Thus, several political parties supported programs aimed at restricting or revoking the rights Jews had acquired through emancipation, and the Jewish question became a useful device for mobilizing voters. Le Mouvement Anti-Smitique en Russie.” (The Antisemitic Movement in Russia). Cover of La Rpublique Illustre (no. 324; Paris, 25 September 1886) depicting mobs destroying attacking Jews and destroying a Jewish home in Nizhni Novgorod, Russia. (Moldovan Family Collection) In Hungary, Jewish emancipation was granted in 1867. As early as 1875 a representative of the liberal party in power, Gyz Istczy (18421915), urged in parliament that Jewish immigration from the east be curbed and in 1878, in his so-called Palestine speech, proposed that Jews be sent off to a restored Jewish state. Istczy supported his position with both racial and religious arguments, and the rising tide of antisemitism in Germany and Austria, and later the pogroms in Russia, fueled his campaign. From 1880 he published the monthly 12 Rpirat, in which he announced the establishment of a Central Association of Non-Jewish Hungarians to fight against Jewish influence. Students at the University of Budapest, especially in the law and medical faculties, expressed their support for Istczy and petitioned the rector in 1881 against the overrepresentation of Jews. Later that year, a petition from Vasvr in Istczys electoral district called for revoking Jewish emancipation. Istczy received support from Gza nody, Gyula Verhovay, the editor of Fggetlensg (Independence), and Ivn Simonyi, the editor of Westungarischer Grenzbote. But it was the Tiszaeszlr ritual murder accusation and the popular riots it generated throughout the country in 1882 and 1883 that gave Hungarian antisemitism a great boost. In the wake of the Dresden International Conference, Christian defense societies were established throughout the country. Five members of parliament, drawn mainly from the ranks of the left-wing opposition Independence Party, joined Istczys association, some with more moderate, others with more radical anti-Jewish measures in mind. In October 1883, two months after the conclusion of the Tiszaeszlr trial, the National Antisemitic Party (Orszagos Antiszemita Party) was formed and won 17 seats in parliament and a majority in the municipal council of Pressburg (Bratislava). Internal conflicts led Istczy to leave the party in 1885 to form the National Moderate Antisemitic Party. By the 1887 elections, the combined strength of the two parties had dropped to 11 seats, and many of the leading figures returned to the mainstream. After 1890, attacks against Jews in Hungary came mainly from anticapitalist agrarian associations and clerical circles that formed the conservative Npprt (Peoples Party) in 1895 during the culture wars against the introduction of civil marriage and the reception of Judaism. In imperial Russia, many right-wing political parties that proclaimed themselves defenders of orthodoxy, autocracy, and the Russian idea appeared after the 1905 Revolution. They drew on a tradition of stereotypic portrayals of Jews as nonproductive exploiters of the peasantry that dated to the late eighteenth century, as well as on a literature embodying traditional Christian anti-Jewish motifs, including ritual murder and the threat of a secret, worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Two prominent examples of that literature were Kniga kagala (Book of the Kahal) by Jacob Brafman (18251879) and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1905). One especially notorious party was Soiuz Russkogo Naroda (the Union of Russian People; URP), also called Chernaia Sotnia (Black Hundred). Founded in 1905, its first leader was Aleksandr I. Dubrovin. The Union established paramilitary groups that engaged in street violence and assassinations and boycotted Jewish shops. Victims included two Jewish deputies representing the liberal Kadet party (Constitutional Democrats, abbreviated KD, hence their common name). Similar to the Union was Russkoe Sobranie (Russian Assembly), a group of high-ranking military and government officials, established in Saint Petersburg in 1900; it became a political party in 1905. That same year the most powerful and influential right-wing organization, Soiuz Russkich Liudei (Union of Russian People; URP), was established in Moscow. Count P. S. Sheremetev, whose goal was to fight Jewish influence in all fields of Russian life by combining anti-Jewish slogans with populist anticapitalist and antiurban rhetoric, led it. These parties had little electoral success. The controlled, stable, and consistent discriminatory practices of the tsar and the ruling class tended to neutralize the extremist parties, who served more to maintain general hostility against Jews and to perpetuate anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes. In Congress Poland, antisemitic parties and movements appealed to the proletariat and middle class under a nationalist program of struggle against Jewish competition and Russian oppression. After 1905, especially during elections to the Russian Duma, the Jewish question became highly politicized, with Jews depicted as the main domestic threat to Polish society. In Polish regions beyond the Russian Empire, especially in Galicia, peasant parties included the struggle against the Jewish threat in their agendas. These parties included the Union of Peasants Party (Zwizek Stronnictwa Chopskiego; ZSCh), founded in 1893, and the Christian-Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chrzecijasko-Ludowe), founded in 1896 by Father Stanisaw Stojaowski. The National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne; ND), known as Endecja, was the most important Polish nationalist party. Founded in 1893 by Roman Dmowski (18641939), it placed the fight against Jews at the center of its program. In accordance with its perception of Germany as Polands main antagonist, it claimed that German and Polish Jews were together spearheading an anti-Polish conspiracy. According to Endecjas main ideologistsDmowski, Jan Popawski (18541908), and Zygmunt Balicki (18581916)Jews were alien to Poland and incorrigibly hostile to Polish national interests; in order to regain independence, ethnic Poles needed to wrest control of trade and industry from them. Who Is an Antisemite? Russian poster. Printed in the USSR, 19271930. Artwork by Nikolai Denisovski. The poster associates antisemitism with prerevolutionary elements, such as capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and supporters of the tsar. (YIVO) In Romania, an anti-Jewish political movement emerged against the background of the decision by the Congress of Berlin (1878) to condition recognition of Romanian independence upon emancipation of the countrys Jews. Politicians seized upon this external pressure to arouse an atmosphere of vigilance against the danger of Jewish penetration of Romanias political and social life. Political parties and the press associated the presence of Jews in capitalist enterprises with the countrys critical economic situation. Similarly, the peasants revolt of 1888 and the great peasant uprising of 1907 were accompanied by anti-Jewish propaganda. Especially after 1900, politicians also argued that the Jews integration in Romanian society had to be prevented because it jeopardized the states Romanian national character. Antisemitic organizations emerged in Romania in conjunction with similar groups in other countries. The Alliance Antijuive Universelle was founded in Bucharest. In 1895, Alexandru C. Cuza (18571947) founded Aliana Antisemit (Antisemitic Alliance) and Liga Antisemit Universal (Universal Antisemitic League). In 1910, he and the historian Nicolae Iorga (18711940) established the Nationalist Democratic Party with an explicitly anti-emancipationist agenda. The new antisemitic groups had significant influence in the press, but except for Cuza no politician had built a political career relying on an exclusively antisemitic agenda. Anti-Jewish themes could also be found in the programs of the main liberal and conservative parties. Several personalities stood out for their violently hostile rhetoric concerning Jews, including Vasile Conta, Vasile Alecsandri, Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, Mihai Eminescu, and Ioan Slavici. These people were later considered forerunners of the radical antisemitic movements that developed after 1918. The ethnic nationalist parties of the Habsburg and tsarist empires turned increasingly xenophobic upon gaining state power. The Minorities Treaties imposed upon the successor states carved from those empires strengthened right-wing movements by creating a backlash against interference in the internal affairs of the new states. Especially in Poland, Romania, and Hungary, calls to reduce the Jews role in economic and social life became a significant component of interwar nationalism. They were embraced by mainstream parties and taken to extremes by radical nationalist groups. Radical nationalists were politically marginal immediately after World War I, but they eventually succeeded in influencing official policy in a direction inimical to Jewish interests. They attacked liberalism for allowing Jews to prosper economically and reach cultural and intellectual prominence. They also identified Jews with external enemies: the Soviet threat (in Poland and Romania), Hungarian irredentism (in Romania and Slovakia), or Germanization (in Czechoslovakia). Moreover, in Romania and Hungary the military failures of World War I were blamed on Jewish soldiers treacherous and antinational actions. The Bolshevik Revolution and the failed Communist takeover in Hungary under Bla Kun (18861938) further strengthened the stereotype of Judeo-Bolshevism and revived the myth of a Jewish conspiracy for world domination, endowing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion with an aura of prophecy fulfilled. In Poland, the unrest caused by World War I, and especially the war with Bolshevik Russia, exacerbated anti-Jewish hostility. Local acts of violence took place in Galicia and Lithuania, with the most deadly outbreaks in Lww, Pisk, Lida, and Vilna. Endecja, led by Dmowski, called for de-Judaizing the Polish economy and fighting against the Jews infiltration into Polish national culture. In 1926 Dmowski founded Obz Wielkiej Polski (The Camp of Greater Poland; OWP), which, until its dissolution in 1933, demanded the exclusion of Jews (including converts) from political life. In 1934, OWP veterans established Obz Narodowo-Radykalny (National Radical Camp; ONR), which envisaged Poland as the Catholic State of the Polish Nation, with Jews eliminated from all fields of activity. It was outlawed because it resorted to violence, particularly against Jews, but it continued to operate clandestinely. In 1934 it split into two factions: ONR-ABC and ONR-Falanga. ydzi do ghetta! (Jews to the Ghetto!). Polish poster. Printed by Drukarnia i Ksigarnia Sp. z.o.o., Tczew, Poland, 1938. Election poster of Obz Narodowe (National Camp), a right-wing party. The text at bottom reads, Ghettoa closed area where Jews are allowed to live and work until we completely remove them from Poland. In every area of life, we need to delineate a ghetto for them. (YIVO) Catholicism was an important influence on Endecja and other right-wing nationalist groups, although ideologists of these movements also frequently resorted to racist arguments. After the Nazis took power in Germany (1933) and the death of head of state Jzef Pisudski (1935), such arguments became more pronounced. In 1937 former Pisudski followers established Obz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (The Camp of National Unity; OZN), which portrayed Jews as unassimilable and demanded their mass emigration. Several smaller radical groups, close to the Nazi racist model, also became increasingly active toward the end of the 1930s. These included the Partia Narodowych Socjalistw (Party of National Socialists), Zwizek Nacjonalistw Polskich (Association of Polish Nationalists), Radykalny Ruch Uzdrowienia (Radical Movement for Recovery), and Narodowa Socjalistyczna Partia Robotnicza (National Social Workers Party). In Romania, hostility toward Jews was exacerbated by their large numbers in territories incorporated into Greater Romania following World War I, including Transylvania, Bessarabia, northern Bucovina, and part of Dobruja. New organizations and political parties emerged aiming to promote the role of ethnic Romanians in the economy and culture and to limit that of Jews, Hungarians, and other minorities. In 1923 Cuza, a member of parliament almost without interruption between 1911 and 1938, established Liga Aprrii Naional Cretine (League of National Christian Defense; LANC). Cuza sought to discredit the Jews participation in the Romanian war effortan important argument in favor of their emancipationwith accusations of treason, desertion, and spying for the enemy. He also called for a numerus clausus to stop the Jews rush into schools and universities. However, pressure from newer antisemitic groups forced him to place even stronger stress on the unity of the race and the Christian religion, as well as on the need for general mobilization to eliminate the enemy. His LANC party sought to revoke Jews political rights, to expel those who had arrived in the country after 1914, and to ban Jews from the army and from public office. From 1921 the swastika was the symbol of Cuzas movement; he claimed a purely Romanian character of this symbol without referring to its use in Germany. One of Cuzas close collaborators, Nicolae C. Paulescu (18691931), was noted for claiming Jews genetic inferiority. Cuzas increasing racialist radicalism led to a break with his former associate Nicolae Iorga. Iorga argued that Jews needed to be displaced gradually and peacefully from all significant sectors of social life as ethnic Romanians capable of taking their places were trained. Nevertheless, by associating the promotion of Romanian spiritual values with the fight against the Jewish threat, Iorga lent legitimacy to the antisemitic movements and bestowed an aura of patriotic mission on them. Octavian Goga (18811938), a renowned poet and assiduous advocate of the rights of Romanians from Transylvania, joined Cuza in 1935 to found the Partidul Naional Cretin (National Christian Party). He justified his anti-Jewish attitude on objective grounds: changing demographics following a wave of undesirable intruders from Bessarabia and Bucovina, Transylvanian Jews philoMagyarism, Jews control of the national press, their harmful infiltration of cultural life, and their threat to Romanian ethnic purity. Nevertheless, exposing the spiritual threat posed by Jews became Gogas priority. In 1927 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, a law student and former disciple of Cuza, founded the fascist movement Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail (Legion of the Archangel Michael), eventually known, after 1930, as Garda de Fier (the Iron Guard). The legion originally brought together students during the struggle for a numerus clausus; later it drew on the lower middle classes. The Iron Guard reached its greatest influence in the 1937 elections with 60 members in parliament, making it the countrys third-largest political party. More than other antisemitic political groups, the Iron Guard stressed Jew equals Communist. The Guard also presented the fight against the Jewish threat as a national mission with a mystical character. Although the Guard had ties to other European fascist movements, it did not claim the Jews racial inferiority and did not adopt the anti-Christian spirit of Nazism. Dovid Frishman, Briv fun Poyln (Letter from Poland), early 1920s. In this article Frishman writes that it is said that extreme nationalist parties such as Roman Dmowski’s Endecja are being influenced by Romanian-style antisemitism. But actually, Poland has a much more complicated relationship with antisemitism. In Poland, Jews are not hated, they are “despised,” which is much worse. The epithets “Pan Moshek [Little Mister Moyshe] and “Pan Itsek [Little Mister Yitskhok] symbolize this disdain. Today, antisemites in Poland are angry because they are still mired in the world of long ago, whereas Jews have moved on and become modern and are no longer willing to put up with this sort of thing. Today’s Jew will answer back, but watch out: with his son it will be even worse. He’ll hit you or do even more damage. Poland is still today a feudal and ethnocratic society, mired in romanticism while the rest of Europe has moved on. Antisemitism in Poland is not just a matter of “politics,” but also a deep reflection of national psychology.Yiddish. RG 108, Manuscripts Collection, F67.13. (YIVO) An early prominent supporter of the Guard was Nichifor Crainic (theologian, poet, writer, politician), the main theoretician of the traditionalist and Christian Orthodox antisemitic trends. Philosopher and journalist Nae Ionescus affiliation with the Iron Guard attracted a new generation of intellectuals to the legionary revolution. His disciples followed their master in the spectacular guardist conversion, which began in 1933 and peaked in 19371938. After Codreanus assassination in 1938, Horia Sima took over the leadership of the Guard; he joined general Ion Antonescu in leading the national-legionary state in September 1940. The Iron Guard would play an important part in passing several antisemitic laws and in organizing violent actions against Jews. The climax was the pogrom in Bucharest on 2122 January 1941, during a failed attempt by the Guard to seize power. Antonescu repressed and dissolved the Iron Guard, but many of the former members of the movement were still active in the massacres against the Jewish population ordered by the Antonescu regime during World War II. In Hungary, territorial losses after World War I led to a feeling of national humiliation and generated a significant increase in the influence of antisemitic political movements, especially after the failure of Bla Kuns revolution. The postrevolutionary right-wing dictatorship began with a period of White Terror (autumn 1919summer 1920), including anti-Jewish massacres. The regime then embarked on a fight against Jewish economic domination. In September 1920, the so-called numerus clausus law made Hungary the first state in interwar Europe to establish quotas on Jews in higher education. Numerous public organizations and professional associations adopted similar agendas. The strongest was the Hungarian Association of National Defense (Magyar Orszgos Vder Egylet; MOVE, established in November 1918); its president was Gyula Gmbs (18861936), a future prime minister. Radical, xenophobic, and antisemitic right-wing parties that supported revision of the postwar peace settlements dominated the political scene. In November 1924, radical politicians established the Party of Racial Defense (Fajvd Prt), which received four mandates in the 1926 parliamentary elections, but was dissolved by Gmbs in 1928. In October 1925, an international congress of antisemitic parties and groups, dominated by Gmbs, was held in Budapest. Gmbs became prime minister in 1932 and developed his political agenda in the spirit of Nazi racism, although in practice he maintained a relatively moderate attitude toward the Jewish community, and by 1933 distanced himself from Nationalist Socialism. Bla Imrdy formed the government in May 1938, and two weeks later the First Jewish Law was passed, limiting the proportion of Jewish participation in the liberal professions and commercial and industrial businesses to 20 percent. Under the Pl Teleki government, in 1939 the Second Jewish Law was passed, limiting Jewish participation to 6 percent. Jews were defined according to racial criteria; hence the law also governed Jewish converts to Christianity and persons only partially of Jewish origin. The decrees against Jews became harsher with the beginning of the war and the increase of Nazi influence. The extreme fascist and racist organization, the Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Prt-Hungarista Mozgalom) established by Ferenc Szlasi in 1939, won 31 mandates in that years elections while other allied parties received another 15, a considerable increase over the two they had received in 1935. They formed a united Arrow Cross Party in 1940. Henceforth official policy toward Jews oscillated between the moderate traditional antisemitism of the conservatives (represented by governor Admiral Mikls Horthy and Pl Teleki) and the radical antisemitism represented by Arrow Cross. In Czechoslovakia, the political atmosphere between the world wars differed from that in neighboring countries. Antisemitic parties existed for the most part only in Slovakia and the Sudetenland. Tom Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, was a firm opponent of efforts to restrict Jewish rights. However, the urban Jewish bourgeoisies preference for German language and culture evoked hostility from Czechs, and several nationalist movements made political capital of this situation. From 1918, Agrarian Party newspapers attacked Jews as pro-German and Bolshevik agents and accused them of having caused postwar social and economic difficulties. Sudeten Germans ensured the electoral success of Konrad Henleins pro-Nazi Sudetendeutsche Partei (Party of Sudeten Germany) in the 1930s. In Slovakia, hostility was generated by the fact that before World War I Jews had been identified with Hungarian rule. The Slovak Catholic Church tended to favor politicians with nationalist and antisemitic programs. A prominent Slovak nationalist political leader, Vavro robr (18671950), accused the Jews of pro-Magyarism and of Bolshevik convictions. The priest Andrej Hlinka (18641938) established the main antisemitic party, Slovenska Ludova Strana (Slovak People’s Party), in 1925. Xenophobic nationalism with a strong Catholic component, also espoused by Hlinkas successor, the theologian Jozef Tiso, became a dominant feature of the party. The fascist militia set up by this party in 1938, the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkov Garda), actively participated in the deportation of Jews to Nazi killing centers. In the context of the Soviet Union and its satellite states where formal political parties or movements were officially illegal, this discussion is concerned less with parties and organizations than with state antisemitism. The parameters for anti-Jewish political activity under Communist regimes were set in the USSR following the Bolshevik revolution. Soviet law forbade public expressions of antisemitism and antisemitic political activity. During the first years of Soviet rule, a large number of Jewish Bolsheviks took leading positions in the party and state hierarchies. After Lenins death (1924), Joseph Stalins struggle against his political rival, Leon Trotsky, became increasingly marked by anti-Jewish expressions, and the accusation of Trotskyism was used in the 1930s to eliminate many Jewish Bolshevik leaders, intellectuals, and artists, as well as to de-Judaize the higher ranks of the party, military, and state hierarchies. After World War II, Stalinist policy became increasingly hostile to Jews, with the most important campaigns taking place under the slogan of struggle against American imperialism, Zionism, cosmopolitanism, and economic sabotage. Jewish access to higher education and public office was limited. Members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were tried and executed, and in early 1953 several prominent Jewish doctors were accused of plotting to poison Soviet leaders. After Stalins death, the Soviet regime systematically prevented calling attention to the particular tragedy of the Jewish population during World War II. Less intense discrimination continued during the regimes of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev in the 1960s and 1970s, generally under the slogans of the struggle against Zionism and the State of Israel. It was only with Mikhail Gorbachevs liberalization in the late 1980s that the first antisemitic organizations surfaced in the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, glasnost favored the emergence of numerous right-wing Russian nationalist groups with xenophobic agendas, supported also by renowned intellectuals (such as the mathematician Igor Shafarevich) and by cultural journals such as Nash sovremennik (Our Contemporary), Molodaya gvardiya (Young Guard), and others. During the early 1980s, the nationalist antisemitic organization Pamiat (Memory) was established; in 1987 it was transformed into the National-Patriotic Front (NPF), led by Dmitrii Vasilev. The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, especially during the Stalinist period, followed a direction similar to the one enforced by the Kremlin leaders, with variations from country to country. The new regimes inaugurated a radical change in the situation of Jews who had survived the Holocaust: Jews who were devoted to the regime penetrated the political hierarchy of the country, acquiring power and privileges. However, these Jews soon became victims of purges within the party and of show trials in the 1950s, together with numerous imprisoned Zionist activists. The Communist parties in Eastern Europe thus created a new Jewish question, officially condemning antisemitism but disguising it in practice under the rhetorical cover of a fight against Zionism and bourgeois nationalism. The former slogan Jew equals Communist was replaced by Jew equals Zionist. In the popular imagination, however, the identification of Jews with the new Communist regimes persisted. In Czechoslovakia, official antisemitism surfaced before and during the show trial of the former Communist leader Rudolf Slnsk (19501952). He was sentenced to death together with 10 other Communist leaders (all but three of Jewish origin), accused of espionage, Zionism, and Titoism. The anti-Zionist diversion was used again to compromise and annihilate the liberalization movement of the party in 1968. Poland, under Wadysaw Gomukas leadership, experienced a first wave of official antisemitism in 1956. A second wave in 19671968 was marked by attacks upon Jews unprecedented under Communist rule, followed by massive purges and a new exodus of Jews from Poland. Several party leaders made overt use of anti-Jewish rhetoric, especially the group led by the nationalist Mieczysaw Moczar. In the 1980s, after the emergence of the free trade union movement Solidarno (Solidarity), the regime attempted, unsuccessfully, to compromise several leaders of the movement by tendentiously revealing their (real or imaginary) Jewish origins. In Hungary, after an initial postwar surge of rhetoric hostile to Jews, which culminated with Lszl Rajks trial (1949), the government that took power after the repression of the 1956 uprising, led by Jnos Kdr, kept antisemitic outbursts under control. However, it consistently pursued an anti-Israeli policy. In Romania, Ana Paukers overthrow in 1952 was prepared based on an investigation with many antisemitic features, but it concluded without a trial or an ostentatious anti-Zionist campaign. Party leaders sought to implement a Romanianization of the higher ranks. A significant change occurred in the 1960s, especially under Nicolae Ceauescus leadership. Essentially xenophobic, Ceauescus national ideology regarded Jewish emigration as the most convenient way to improve the ethnic structure of the population and to insure that ethnic Romanians held positions of authority. Ceauescu avoided Soviet-type anti-Zionist propaganda, however, and maintained good relations with the state of Israel; but at the same time he allowed and sometimes encouraged attacks upon Jews in the party-controlled press. With the fall of the East European Communist regimes and the dismemberment of the USSR, the disappearance of controlled or official antisemitism was followed by the privatization of antisemitism and the emergence of numerous, often ephemeral, political groups with an anti-Jewish orientation. The new extreme right-wing parties emerging in Eastern Europe revived the heritage of the radical antisemitic parties of the period between the two world wars, including use of the same party names and resumption of the political agenda and ideology of such parties. In the Russian Federation, one of Pamiats leaders, Aleksandr Barkashov, withdrew in 1990 and established the Russkoe Natsionalnoe Edinstvo (Russian National Unity; RNE), supported by several nationalist members of the Duma. Oleg Kasin replaced Barkashov in 2000. There were about 30 similar organizations in the late 1990s. Except for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, these groups did not have significant success in elections, although they succeeded in fostering latent anti-Jewish feelings and occasional violent outbursts. The National Patriots, led by Sergei Baburin, stood out among such groups. In 2003, Rodina (Motherland), a bloc of nationalist and left-wing populist parties led by Dmitrii Rogozin and Sergei Glazev and including Sergei Baburins Narodnaya Volya (Peoples Will) party, obtained 28 percent of the seats in the Duma. Some of these organizations enjoyed the sympathy and support of Orthodox church leaders. Gennadii Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, also overtly adopted anti-Jewish slogans. Another national Bolshevik party was established by the writer Eduard Limonov. While encouraging Russian nationalism but repeatedly accusing others of antisemitism, Vladimir Putins authoritarian regime neutralized to a certain extent the influence of the antisemitic organizations and parties that emerged in the 1990s, though it took no legal action against them. While not as prominent as in the Russian Federation, antisemitic rhetoric reemerged in Ukraine in the post-Communist period. Extremist groups supporting Ukrainian ethnocracy took to identifying Jews with Western democracy, which had allegedly caused economic and political deadlock. The most influential such organization was a bloc of extremist parties united in the Ukrainian National Assembly (Ukrainska Natsionalna Asambleia; UNA), with a paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian Self-Defense (Ukrainska Natsionalna Samooborona; UNSO). The party ideology, expressed by one of its leaders, Dmytro Korchinskii, was a mix of pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. Other groups with a similar political profile included the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv; OUN), the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (Ukrainska Konservatyvna Respublikanska Partiia; UKRP), and the Ukrainian Social-Nationalist Party (Sotsial-Natsionalna Partiia Ukrainy; SNPU). Derzhavna Samostiynist Ukrainy (State Independence of Ukraine; DSU), established in Lviv in 1990, is another extreme right-wing organization. In many cases, the ideological antisemitism of such groups is a component of a xenophobic messianic doctrine according to which Jews are leading participants in an anti-Ukrainian conspiracy. The influence of such parties was negligible in electoral polling; only 23 percent of respondents defined themselves as ultranationalists hostile to Jews. In the absence of significant parliamentary representation, such parties focused on publishing leaflets and magazines hostile to Jews. The situation in Belarus is more serious than in other former Soviet republics. Under Aleksandr Lukashenkos dictatorial regime several active extremist organizations have operated, though their membership and political support are limited. Some of them have a clear Nazi and racist orientation and operate illegally. Such organizations include Rus, led by Gennadii Vlasov, and the Belarus Peoples Patriot Movement (NPDB), led by Viktor Chikin. There are also branches of Russian extremist organizations, such as the Belarus National Bolsheviks, led by Viktor Gordeev, a subsidiary of Eduard Limonovs party and a subsidiary of the Russian National Unity (RNE), led by Andrei Sakovich. Radical groups in the Baltic States set as their main objective the consolidation of national identity, aiming to combat the heritage of the Soviet period and the effects of forced Russification. Ethnic tensions were more pronounced in relation to Russian and Polish minorities than to Jews. Anti-Jewish attitudes and statements arose mainly in connection with public discussion of the Jews participation in the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the Baltic region. The most sensitive issue was the debate on the participation of the local population in Nazi massacres during the Holocaust and the rehabilitation of war criminals, including veterans of SS divisions in Latvia. Several radical extremist parties were represented in the Latvian parliament, including For the Fatherland and Freedom (Tevzemei un Brivibai; TB), and Peoples Movement for Latvia (Tautas Kustiba Latvijai, Zigerist Partija). Certain generally illegal branches of various extremist parties from the Russian Federation, such as the pro-Nazi party Russian National Unity (RNE), became extremely active within Russian minority circles in the Baltic States. A party that had been active in the interwar years was reestablished in Lithuaniathe Lithuanian Nationalist Party Young Lithuania (Lietuviu Nacionaline Partija Jaunoji Lietuva); it received 4 percent of the vote in 1996. It is led by Stanislovas Buskevicius, a xenophobic extreme nationalist politician, and a declared opponent of Jewish influence. In Poland, the presidential election campaign was the first significant political arena in which anti-Jewish motifs appeared after the fall of communism. Some leaders of the Solidarno Party attributed an imaginary Jewish ancestry to other candidates. Emerging nationalist political groups rediscovered and exploited the spirit of Dmowskis Endecja. Dmowski himself was rehabilitated and celebrated as one of the main ideologists of Polish nationalism. The most dynamic antisemitic organization is Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland; NOP) led by Adam Gmurczyk, which claims to be the heir of ONR and includes groups of skinheads. Other active organizations, though less influential, are Zwizek Biaego Ora (White Eagle Union; ZBO); Polska Wsplnota NarodowaPolskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (Polish National CommunityPolish National Party), led by the former Marxist Bolesaw Tejkowski; and Modzie Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth), led by Roman Giertych, who since 2006 has been Polands minister of education. Another revived organization is Stronnictwo Narodowe (following Endecjas model). Traditional Catholic hostility toward Jews continues in extremist political discourse in Poland. A remarkable political force is Radio Maryja, which is extremely popular and propounds a mix of Catholic messages with nationalist, anti-Jewish, and xenophobic populism. On the other hand, in liberal Catholic intellectual and clerical circles, especially those surrounding the periodicals Tygodnik Powszechny, Wi, and Znak, a strong, though minority, liberal group has emerged that is active in fighting antisemitism. In Poland, tensions related to Holocaust memory are linked to frustration on the part of some Poles who maintain that their suffering under Nazi occupation is not sufficiently acknowledged in the West. Recent historical studies highlighting the massacre of Jews by Poles at Jedwabne in 1941 and pogroms in Poland during the first years after the war led to heated debates and to significant anti-Jewish reactions in the press. However, a number of intellectuals and politiciansJan Bonski, Jacek Kuro, Jan Jzef Lipski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Maria Janion, and former president Aleksander Kwaniewskihave consistently condemned antisemitism and assumed moral responsibility for crimes committed by Poles or for the indifference of the majority to the fate of Jews at the hands of the Nazis. In Slovakia, nationalist parties and organizations are concerned with exonerating and rehabilitating the image of Jozef Tiso, who is represented as a savior of the Jews. They also minimize the Slovak authorities participation in the deportation of Jews to Nazi killing centers. Among such groups, the most powerful are Slovenska Narodna Strana (Slovak National Party; SNS) and the Matica Slovenska nationalist organization and cultural foundation. Their propaganda also claims a Zionist conspiracy against Slovakia. Other marginal extremist parties are the Slovak Peoples Party (SLS) and Slovenska Pospolitost (Slovak Community), which also includes skinhead groups. In Romania, Partidul Romnia Mare (Great Romania Party; PRM), the first extremist party to emerge after the fall of Ceauescus dictatorship, was also the most aggressive propagator of xenophobia and antisemitism. This party, which became the third-largest political party in Romania, sought to rehabilitate Antonescus regime, denied the Holocaust, and claimed a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Its newspaper, Romnia Mare, mixed anti-Jewish rhetoric with no less hostile statements against Hungarians and the Roma. Other extremist political organizations with a more limited pool of voters, founded in the early 1990s, claimed affiliation to the tradition of the Iron Guard: Micarea pentru Romnia (Movement for Romania; MFR), led by Marian Munteanu; the Party of National Right (PNR) led by Radu Sorescu; the ultranationalist cultural foundation Vatra Romneasc (Romanian Cradle), led by Ion Coja, one of the main ideologists of conspiratorial antisemitism; and erban Surus Legionary Movement. In the 1994 elections in Hungary, extremist parties with a strong antisemitic agenda did not gain more than 1.6 percent of the votes, but one of the governing coalition parties (Hungarian Democratic Forum; MDF) disseminated antisemitic slogans and denied the Holocaust. It was mainly after the 1998 elections that the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), formed by Istvn Csurka in 1993, brought antisemitic and xenophobic rhetoric to parliament. Small neo-Nazi groups, such as the Hungarian Peoples Welfare Association (MNSZ), operate in the spirit of the Arrow Cross. The main topics of antisemitic political discourse concern the responsibility of the Hungarian authorities during the Holocaust and the purported world domination of the Jews. Such topics appeared in the periodicals Szent Korona and Hunia Fzetek. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many East European intellectuals see antisemitic rhetoric as a form of moral dissolution and a belated effect of the later stages of the Communist age and of the confusion caused by the abrupt changes that occurred after the fall of the Communist regimes. Vulgar antisemitism could be thus included among the symptoms of moral crisis. The intellectuals who commit themselves to fighting against such phenomena, those who suggest critical rethinking of issues from the past, and those who oppose populist slogans and nationalist demagogy, often end up being labeled as Jews. Shmuel Almog, Nationalism and Antisemitism in Modern Europe, 18151945 (Oxford and New York, 1990); Yehuda Bauer, ed., Present-Day Antisemitism (Jerusalem, 1988); Jean-Yves Camus, Les extrmismes en Europe: tat des lieux en 1998 (Paris, 1998); Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe (New York, 1993); Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 17001933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); Andrs Kovcs, Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary (Jerusalem, 1999); Paul Lendvai, Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe (New York, 1971); Leon Poliakov, The History of Antisemitism, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 2003); Dina Porat and Roni Stauber, eds., Antisemitism Worldwide, 2000/1 (Lincoln, Nebr., 2002); Peter G.J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, rev. ed. (London, 1988); Michael Shafir, Between Denial and Comparative Trivialization: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe (Jerusalem, 2002); Leon Volovici, Antisemitism in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: A Marginal or Central Issue? (Jerusalem, 1994); Robert Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (London, 1991). HUNGARY: Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, rev. and enl. ed., 2 vols. (New York and Boulder, 1994); Rolf Fischer, Entwicklungsstufen des Antisemitismus in Ungarn, 18671939: Die Zerstrung der magyarisch-jdischen Symbiose (Munich, 1988); Andrew Handler, An Early Blueprint for Zionism: Gyz Istczys Political Anti-Semitism (Boulder and New York, 1989); Nathaniel Katzburg, Antishemiyut be-Hungaryah, 18671944 (Jerusalem, 1992). POLAND: Olaf Bergmann, Narodowa Demokracja wobec problematyki ydowskiej w latach 19181929 (Pozna, Pol., 1998); Stephen David Corrsin, Warsaw before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 18801914 (Boulder and New York, 1989); Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (Princeton, 2006); Israel Gutman et al., eds., The Jews of Poland between Two World Wars (Hanover, N.H., 1989); Jerzy Holzer, Polish Political Parties and Antisemitism, Polin 8 (1994): 194205; Anna Landau-Czajka, The Ubiquitous Enemy: The Jew in the Political Thought of Radical Right-Wing Nationalists in Poland, 19261939, Polin 4 (1989) 169203; Jacek Maria Maj- chrowski, Szkice z historii polskiej prawicy politycznej lat Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Krakw, 1986); Joanna Michlic, Polands Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present (Lincoln, Nebr., and London, 2006); Szymon Rudnicki, Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny: Geneza i dziaalno (Warsaw, 1985); Jerzy Tomaszewski, Zarys dziejw ydw w Polsce w latach 19181939 (Warsaw, 1990). ROMANIA: Armin Heinen, Die Legion Erzengel Michael in Rumnien (Munich, 1986); Carol Iancu, Jews in Romania, 18661919 (Boulder and New York, 1996); Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 19181930 (Ithaca and London, 1995); William O. Oldson, A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania (Philadelphia, 1991); Michael Shafir, The Inheritors: The Romanian Radical Right since 1989, East European Jewish Affairs 24.1 (Summer 1994): 7189; Leon Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s (Oxford and New York, 1991). RUSSIA: John D. Klier, Imperial Russias Jewish Question, 18551881 (Cambridge and New York, 1995); John D. Klier, The Dog That Didnt Bark: Anti-Semitism in Post-Communist Russia, in Russian Nationalism: Past and Present, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, pp.129147 (Basingstoke, Eng., 1998); William Korey, Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism (Chur, Switz., 1995); Matthias Messmer, Sowjetischer und postkommunistischer Antisemitismus: Entwicklungen in Russland, der Ukraine und Litauen (Konstanz, Ger., 1997); Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley, 1986); Vadim Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism in the Post-Communist Era (Lincoln, Nebr., 2002); Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Vladimir Pribylovskii, Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii: Istoriia, ideologiia, ekstremistskie tendentsii (Moscow, 1996). SLOVAKIA: Yeshayahu Andrej Jelinek, The Parish Republic: Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party, 19391945 (Boulder, 1976); Ladislav Lipscher, Die Juden im slowakischen Staat, 19391945 (Munich, 1980); Pavol Metan, Antisemitism in Slovak Politics, 19891999 (Bratislava, 2000). UKRAINE: Liudmila Dymerskaya-Tsigelman and Leonid Finberg, Antisemitism of the Ukrainian Radical Nationalists: Ideology and Policy (Jerusalem, 1999).

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April 24, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

Nazi Germany and Anti-Jewish Policy | ADL

Anti-Jewish Policy by Year1933 Between 1933 and 1938, nearly 150,000 Jews managed to leave Nazi Germany. This number represented approximately 30 percent of the total Jewish population. In order for Jews to legally emigrate from Germany, they were required to have both German passports and visas permitting them to enter another country. Most countries however, had quotas that limited the number of immigrants allowed to enter and required that those entering were able to support themselves. Very few countries admitted German-Jewish refugees, and after the Kristallnacht Pogrom, it became extremely difficult for Jews to leave Germany. Most of the Jews who fled Germany went to other European countries that were occupied by the Nazis months or a few years later. Adapted with permission from Echoes and Reflections. 2005 Anti-Defamation League, USC Shoah Foundation, Yad Vashem, www.echoesandreflections.org. All rights reserved.

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April 2, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

The Nazis & the Jews – Jewish Virtual Library

Bookstore Glossary Library Links News Publications Timeline Virtual Israel Experience Anti-Semitism Biography History Holocaust Israel Israel Education Myths & Facts Politics Religion Travel US & Israel Vital Stats Women donate subscribe Contact About Home Virtual Israel Experience Timeline Publications News Links Glossary Bookstore Anti-Semitism Biography History Holocaust Israel Israel Education Myths & Facts Politics Religion Travel US & Israel Vital Stats Women Category The Holocaust Basic History Reference Persecution The Nazis Nazis & The Jews Rescuers Biographies World Reaction Aftermath Join our mailing list Support JVL

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January 29, 2018   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

Britain’s last anti-Jewish riots – New Statesman | Britain …

In 1947 a washed-out summer had followed a harsh winter, and Britain was in the grip of recession as it struggled to restart its economy after the Second World War. On the August bank holiday weekend, the weather in Manchester had turned hot and stuffy. Trade in the shops was poor, rationing was in full swing and many workers had opted to stay in the city for the long weekend. In cinema queues and on street corners, one topic dominated the conversation: the murder of two British army sergeants by Irgun paramilitaries in Mandate Palestine. The Irgun was one of several Zionist groups fighting a guerrilla war to force British troops out of the territory and establish the state of Israel. It had kidnapped the two sergeants in retaliation for death sentences passed on three of its own fighters. The three men were executed by British forces on 29 July, and two days later the bodies of the soldiers were discovered amid the trees of a eucalyptus grove near Netanya. They had been hanged and the ground beneath them booby-trapped with a landmine. It was just one incident of many in a vicious conflict. Militants had bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem a year previously, and even set off small bombs in London. But the sergeants affair, as it came to be known, caused public outrage in mainland Britain. On 1 August, a Friday, the Daily Express reported the story on its front page, prominently displaying a photograph of the bodies which, it promised its readers, would be a picture that will shock the world. British Jewish leaders condemned the killings, but more lurid details followed in the next days papers. That weekend, as Walter Lever, a working-class Jewish resident of Manchester recalled, There was nothing to do but walk the streets . . . discussing the newspaper, the story of the hanged sergeants taking precedence over the weeks murders and rapes. There were already signs that a backlash was imminent. In Birkenhead, near Liverpool, slaughterhouse workers had refused to process any more meat for Jewish consumption until the attacks on British soldiers in Palestine stopped. Around Merseyside, the anger was starting to spill on to the streets as crowds of angry young men gathered in Jewish areas. On Sunday afternoon the trouble reached Manchester. Small groups of men began breaking the windows of shops in Cheetham Hill, an area just north of the city centre which had been home to a Jewish community since the early 19th century. The pubs closed early that day because there was a shortage of beer, and by the evening the mobs numbers had swelled to several hundred. Most were on foot but others drove through the area, throwing bricks from moving cars. Soon the streets were covered in broken glass and stones and the crowd moved on to bigger targets, tearing down the canopy of the Great Synagogue on Cheetham Hill Road and surrounding a Jewish wedding party at the Assembly Hall. They shouted abuse at the terrified guests until one in the morning. The next day, Lever said, Cheetham Hill Road looked much as it had looked seven years before, when the German bombers had pounded the city for 12 hours. All premises belonging to Jews for the length of a mile down the street had gaping windows and the pavements were littered with glass. By the end of the bank holiday weekend, anti-Jewish riots had also taken place in Glasgow and Liverpool. There were minor disturbances, too, in Bristol, Hull, London and Warrington, as well as scores of attacks on Jewish property across the country. A solicitor in Liverpool and a Glasgow shopkeeper were beaten up. Nobody was killed, but this was the most widespread anti-Jewish violence the UK had ever seen. In Salford, the day after a crowd of several thousand had thrown stones at shop windows, signs appeared that read: Hold your fire. These premises are British. Arsonists in West Derby set fire to a wooden synagogue; workers at Canada Dock in Liverpool returned from the holidays to find Death to all Jews painted above the entrance. And in Eccles, a former sergeant major named John Regan was fined 15 for telling a crowd of 700: Hitler was right. Exterminate every Jew every man, woman and child. What are you afraid of? Theres only a handful of police. Just two years after British troops had liberated Bergen-Belsen, the language of the Third Reich had resurfaced, this time at home. Anger about what had happened in Palestine was one thing, but it seemed to have unleashed something far more vicious. Whitechapel, London, 2012. I am waiting outside the library a glassy new building just up the high street from the Victorian edifice where a generation of self-educated Jewish intellectuals and artists congregated in the early years of the 20th century to meet Max Levitas. Its a Thursday afternoon and I have interrupted his weekly ritual: a trip to the Turkish bath in Bethnal Green, a walk that Levitas still makes, alone, at the age of 97. Born in Dublin in 1915 to Jewish refugee parents from the Baltic, Levitas has lived in Whitechapel since 1930. In 1947 when the rioting erupted, he was a local councillor and member of the Communist Party. Although London was spared riots on the scale of those in the north, he recalls how the hanging sergeants incident compounded animosity towards Jews in the East End. I opposed the hanging when I spoke at meetings, but the main fight was dealing with racism that foreigners were getting jobs and Jews were getting jobs. This was one sign that the anti-Jewish feeling had a deeper source than any act of terrorism in the Middle East. Postwar austerity was at its harshest. Contrary to the cheery Keep Calm and Carry On nostalgia with which the period is recalled today, it was a time of hunger and poverty. A fuel shortage during the winter of 1946-47 had led to soaring unemployment; in the spring of 1947 it peaked at 1.9 million. Hopes that anti-Semitism, which had re-emerged during previous economic downturns, would have disappeared with the defeat of Hitler were short-lived. Instead, as the historian Tony Kushner has written in an essay on the links between austerity and the 1947 riots, a popular stereotype persisted of Jews as black marketeers gaining from the war but not contributing to the effort. The extension of rationing kept the stereotype alive. Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary, had made remarks about the Jews of Europe pushing to the front of the queue and during the fuel crisis he made a quip about Israelites, insinuating that Jewish black marketeers were hoarding fuel. Worse still, Jewish loyalty over Palestine was being questioned openly. In the opening days of 1947 the Sunday Times had addressed an editorial to British Jews in which the paper accused them of failing to perform their civic duty and moral obligations by denouncing the anti-British violence in Palestine. In Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester, where the worst rioting took place, the downturn was at its most painful. These cities had the highest levels of unemployment in Britain and even though the disturbances initially targeted the Jews they quickly progressed to generalised looting. Get the Jews, get the stuff and get into the shops, was one shout heard in Manchester. Not for the first (or last) time, racism and economic exclusion combined and formed a poisonous resentment. Levitas had been part of the crowd that faced down Oswald Mosleys Blackshirts on Cable Street in the East End in October 1936. Like many trade unionists, he was alarmed at the resurgence of violence. There was a feeling that wed just had a war against fascism, and that wed got to ensure that the fascists didnt do again what they did in the Thirties. Although the violence in 1947 was not orchestrated by fascist political parties, it emboldened the remaining adherents. Jeffrey Hamm, a former member of the British Union of Fascists who was now in charge of the League of Ex-Servicemen, visited the north-west of England and attempted to stir up trouble. Fascists displayed copies of the Daily Expresss hanging sergeants front page at their meetings. And in 1948 Oswald Mosley, who had been interned in Holloway Prison during the war, launched a new party, the Union Movement. At the end of the war, 43 Jewish ex-servicemen had set up a clandestine group to infiltrate fascist meetings and break up their opponents rallies by fighting in the street. The 43 Group was the first of several such organisations. Levitas believes that one reason the fascists were kept at bay, and why east London stayed relatively calm through the late 1940s, is that the lessons of the 1930s had been learned. Only through the integration of society could we play a major part in stopping racism, he told me. For him, this integration went beyond anti-fascist protest; it involved people demanding for themselves jobs, housing and education for their kids. To ensure that whatever religion youve got, whatever your colour, you play a part in society. On 5 August, four days after its sensationalised coverage had triggered the riots, the Express appealed for calm. No more of this! it implored readers, arguing that the attacks on innocent shopkeepers had become a national disgrace. In Manchester, the violence had subsided, leaving an ugly atmosphere. For the rest of the week, Lever recalled, one overheard behind one in the bus, over ones shoulder at the next caf table,a row ahead in the cinema, whispering anecdotes and muttered abuse relating to the events of the Sunday night. A dividing line had been drawn through daily life where none appeared to exist before. Rachel Barash, who had worked for the Jewish hospitality committee that brought refugee children over from Germany and the Netherlands during the 1930s, remembered how the riots sparkeda nasty stand-off between boys from rival youth clubs. Until that point, the refugees, who were housed in the suburban village of Withington, had been welcomed and treated as our children by their neighbours. Now Jewish boys across Manchester gathered together, ready to defend themselves. Yet the tension dissipated almost as quickly as violence had surged: in the words of another Manchester resident, Agnes Sussman, It all passed over as if nothing had happened. Today, there is little mention of the riots in the official histories. There are only a couple of academic essays beyond Kushner’s study, and the violence in Liverpool forms a backdrop to the play Three Sisters on Hope Street, the 2008 retelling of Chekhov by Diane Samuels and Tracy-Ann Oberman. Elsewhere, they are viewed as an insignificant footnote to the story of the creation of the state of Israel. Why have the riots been forgotten? According to Dave Rich, deputy director of communications at the Community Security Trust, a charity established in 1994 to ensure the safety and security of British Jews, one reason was that there were much bigger things to worry about then. The full horrors of the Holocaust were still coming to light; efforts to establish the state of Israel were ongoing; and in Britain, for Zionist and non-Zionist Jews alike, there were more pressing economic concerns. Given that few people were actually hurt in the riots, Rich says, its understandable that, in the wider picture of what is on the mind of Jews at that time, it would very quickly get relegated. British politicians, too, were keen to sweep things under the carpet. James Chuter Ede, the postwar home secretary, dismissed the rioting as mere hooliganism . . . rather than an indication of public feeling, while magistrates condemned rioters as un-British and unpatriotic. Nations need their feel-good stories and as Rich points out, The thought that those popular anti-Jewish riots could happen two years after the Holocaust in Britain . . . runs counter to the anti-fascist mythology of Britains role in the war. Who wants to go digging that up? Yet the riots were neither an aberration nor the product of an unruly working class. Britain was experiencing an identity crisis: it had won the war but appeared to be losing the peace, with recession at home and the break-up of its empire abroad, in which the events in Mandate Palestine played only a small part. As colonised peoples increasingly demanded independence, Britain turned to a more inward-looking nationalism. Along with it came the question of who would be included and who would be left out. In 1948, with cross-party support, the Labour government passed the British Nationality Act, marking a shift from a situation where all those living in the empire in theory, although quite evidently not in practice were equal subjects under the Crown to one where each country in the Commonwealth could determine its own version of citizenship. Although in the years to come it would be non-whiteimmigrants from the Commonwealth who would most strongly challenge received notions of Englishness and Britishness and who would bear the brunt of racism, Jews, too, were caught up in this, for a brief period. There is one other reason why this episode is worth remembering. On the face of it, there are striking similarities with the way modern Britain has responded to Islamist-inspired terror. Now, as then, events in the Middle East have violent repercussions on Britains streets. Home-grown terrorists have set off bombs in London; tabloid newspapers give sensationalist coverage to attacks on our boys fighting abroad and question the loyalty of British people of a different faith, this time Muslims. This in turn has provoked an angry backlash in the form of the far-right English Defence League. At the same time, integration is a demand made of outsiders to adopt our values, to become more like us. In doing so, some of todays integrationists hold up British Jews as a kind of model community. In 2006 at a ceremony to commemorate the 350th anniversary of Cromwells readmission of the Jews into England, Tony Blair told a congregation at Bevis Marks Synagogue: As the oldest minority faith community in this country, you show how identity through faith can be combined with a deep loyalty to our nation. Less was said about how we arrived at this point. Yet it is best to see the events of 1947 as the end of a chapter rather than the beginning of one. A year later, the state of Israel was formed and Chaim Weizmann, who had lived and worked in Manchester, was appointed as its first president. Britains duplicitous conduct towards Jews and Arabs since it had taken control of Palestine in 1920, the dispossession of the Palestinians and the nasty guerrilla war were events that it suited both sides to pretend had never happened. Relations were soon normalised and nobody cared to recall the brief moment when the messy end to a colonial misadventure was played out on British streets. Today Cheetham Hill, the old Jewish quarter of Manchester, is home to people of many faiths and none. Most of the old buildings were knocked down in the 1970s and one ornate former synagogue is now a clothing warehouse, its stained-glass Star of David window cracked and boarded up. But this is no cause for mourning; many Jews simply moved further up the road, taking their places of worship with them. At least 35,000 still live in Manchester, which has the largest Jewish population in the UK outside London. The sergeants affair is a fading memory, snatches of which are preserved on a handful of reel-to-reel recordings in local history archives. Yet somewhere amid the ghostly swirl of recollections, a painful irony remains: one of the murdered soldiers, Clifford Martin, was Jewish. Thanks to the Manchester Jewish Museum Tony Kushner’s essay “Anti-Semitism and austerity: the August 1947 riots in Britain” is published in Panikos Panayi (ed.), “Racial Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” (Leicester University Press, 1996) Daniel Trillings Bloody Nasty People: the Rise of Britains Far Right will be published by Verso in September. Follow him on Twitter @trillingual

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December 16, 2017   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

Teenage Sisters Singing: Neo-Nazi Beliefs Have Changed as …

Published on Jul 20, 2011 Two girls who used to play in a neo-Nazi band explain what drove them to change. For more, click here: http://abcn.ws/r7EnGP Watch Full Episode of GMA: http://abcn.ws/q1OJPj

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December 12, 2017   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

VIDEO: Watch Former NHL Great Jeremy Roenick Capture Rattlesnake with Two Golf Clubs

Former Chicago Blackhawk great Jeremy Roenick was not only the king of the ice, he appears to have a future as a snake tamer. A video has surfaced showing Roenick capturing a dangerous rattlesnake using only two golf clubs.

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November 21, 2017   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

Terry Glenn: Former New England Patriots WR Dies in Car Wreck

Nov. 20 (UPI) — Longtime New England Patriots wide receiver Terry Glenn died in a car accident Monday morning. He was 43-years-old.

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November 21, 2017   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed

FS1’s Sharpe Sides with Trump, Slams LaVar Ball for Being Ungrateful

Monday on Fox Sports 1’s “Undisputed,” host Shannon Sharpe sided with President Donald Trump after the president lamented working with Chinese government to get three UCLA basketball players released after they were detained on shoplifting charges because LaVar Ball, the father of one of the players, acted like Trump played no role in his son’s release. “Who?” Ball responded when he was asked by ESPN about Trump’s involvement in his son’s release. Sharpe said even people who dislike Trump would agree with him in his feud with Ball. “I can assure you even the people that dislike President Trump the most would agree that LaVar Ball is wrong in this situation. I guarantee you that,” Sharpe told co-host Skip Bayless. “Now, you might dislike what he’s done, what he’s said and who he is, but he had some effect on these kids coming home.” Sharpe then said that if Ball’s “kleptomaniac son” would not have been taking stuff in China, this conversation would not be happening. “If your son would have kept his sticky ass fingers in his pockets and not take people’s stuff in China, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. So, you talk about ‘who?’ — your kleptomaniac son is who!” he exclaimed. Follow Trent Baker on Twitter @MagnifiTrent

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November 21, 2017   Posted in: Anti-Jewish  Comments Closed


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