Archive for the ‘Zionism’ Category

Zionism | Definition of Zionism by Merriam-Webster

: an international movement originally for the establishment of a Jewish national or religious community in Palestine and later for the support of modern Israel

1896, in the meaning defined above

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September 15, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

Zionism – definition of Zionism by The Free Dictionary

A political movement that supports the maintenance and preservation of the state of Israel as a Jewish homeland, originally arising in the late 1800s with the goal of reestablishing a Jewish homeland in the region of Palestine.

Zionist adj. & n.

Zionistic adj.

1. (Judaism) a political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, now concerned chiefly with the development of the modern state of Israel

2. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) a political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, now concerned chiefly with the development of the modern state of Israel

3. (Judaism) a policy or movement for Jews to return to Palestine from the Diaspora

4. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) a policy or movement for Jews to return to Palestine from the Diaspora

Zionist n, adj

Zionistic adj

n.

a worldwide Jewish movement for the establishment and development of the state of Israel.

[18951900]

Zionist, n., adj.

Zi`onistic, adj.

a worldwide Jewish movement for the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for Jews. Zionist, Zionite, n. Zionist, Zionistic, adj.

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Zionism: Is Zionism Racism? – Jewish Virtual Library

In 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution slandering Zionism by equating it with racism. In his spirited response to the resolution, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Chaim Herzog noted the irony of the timing, the vote coming exactly 37 years after Kristallnacht.

Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, which holds that Jews, like any other nation, are entitled to a homeland.

History has demonstrated the need to ensure Jewish security through a national homeland. Zionism recognizes that Jewishness is defined by shared origin, religion, culture and history.

The realization of the Zionist dream is exemplified by more than four million Jews, from more than 100 countries, including dark-skinned Jews from Ethiopia, Yemen and India, who are Israeli citizens. Approximately 1,000,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, Baha’is, Circassians and other ethnic groups also are represented in Israel’s population.

Many Christians have traditionally supported the goals and ideals of Zionism. Israel’s open and democratic character and its scrupulous protection of the religious and political rights of Christians and Muslims rebut the charge of exclusivity.

The Arab states define citizenship strictly by native parentage. It is almost impossible to become a naturalized citizen in many Arab states, especially Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Several Arab nations have laws that facilitate the naturalization of foreign Arabs, with the specific exception of Palestinians. Jordan, on the other hand, instituted its own “law of return” in 1954, according citizenship to all former residents of Palestine, except for Jews.

The presence of thousands of black Jews in Israel is the best refutation of the calumny against Zionism. In a series of historic airlifts – labeled Operations Moses (1984), Joshua (1985) and Solomon (1991), Israel rescued almost 42,000 members of the ancient Ethiopian Jewish community.

To single out Jewish self-determination for condemnation is itself a form of racism. “A world that closed its doors to Jews who sought escape from Hitler’s ovens lacks the moral standing to complain about Israel’s giving preference to Jews,” wrote noted civil rights lawyer Alan Dershowitz.

When approached by a student who attacked Zionism, Martin Luther King responded: “When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti-Semitism.”

The 1975 UN resolution was part of the Soviet-Arab Cold War anti-Israel campaign. Almost all the former non-Arab supporters of the resolution have apologized and changed their positions. When the General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution in 1991, only some Arab and Muslim states, as well as Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam were opposed.

Below, you can listen to Chaim Herzog’s historic speech lambasting the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, and US ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s response to the resolution as well.

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Fundamentalism | religious movement | Britannica.com

Fundamentalism, type of militantly conservative religious movement characterized by the advocacy of strict conformity to sacred texts. Once used exclusively to refer to American Protestants who insisted on the inerrancy of the Bible, the term fundamentalism was applied more broadly beginning in the late 20th century to a wide variety of religious movements. Indeed, in the broad sense of the term, many of the major religions of the world may be said to have fundamentalist movements. For a discussion of fundamentalism in American Protestantism, see fundamentalism, Christian.

In the late 20th century the most influentialand the most controversialstudy of fundamentalism was The Fundamentalism Project (199195), a series of five volumes edited by the American scholars Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Marty and Appleby viewed fundamentalism primarily as the militant rejection of secular modernity. They argued that fundamentalism is not just traditional religiosity but an inherently political phenomenon, though this dimension may sometimes be dormant. Marty and Appleby also contended that fundamentalism is inherently totalitarian, insofar as it seeks to remake all aspects of society and government on religious principles.

Despite its unprecedented breadth, The Fundamentalism Project has been criticized on a number of grounds. One objection is that many of the movements that Marty and Appleby categorize as fundamentalist seem to be motivated less by the rejection of modernity than by social, ethnic, and nationalistic grievances. Indeed, in many cases the people who join such movements have not suffered more than others from the stress and dislocation typically associated with modernization, nor are such stresses and dislocations prominently reflected in the rhetoric or the actions of these movements. The term modernity itself, moreover, is inherently vague; Marty and Appleby, like many other scholars, use it freely but do little to explain what it means.

Another criticism of Marty and Applebys approach is that it is inappropriate to use the term fundamentalism, which originally referred to a movement in American Protestantism, to describe movements in other religions, particularly non-Western ones. This practice has been denounced as a kind of Eurocentric conceptual imperialisman especially sensitive charge in the Islamic world, where those designated fundamentalists are outraged by Western political, economic, and cultural domination.

A third objection is that the significant negative connotations of the term fundamentalismusually including bigotry, zealotry, militancy, extremism, and fanaticismmake it unsuitable as a category of scholarly analysis. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the negative connotations of the term aptly characterize the nature of fundamentalist movements, many of which seek the violent overthrow of national governments and the imposition of particular forms of worship and religious codes of conduct in violation of widely recognized human rights to political self-determination and freedom of worship.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Christian fundamentalists vigorously opposed theological modernism, which, as the higher criticism of the Bible, involved the attempt to reconcile traditional Christian beliefs with modern science and historiography. (For a discussion of modernism in the history of the Roman Catholic Church, see Modernism.) The term fundamentalist was coined in 1920 to describe conservative Evangelical Protestants who supported the principles expounded in The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth (191015), a series of 12 pamphlets that attacked modernist theories of biblical criticism and reasserted the authority of the Bible. The central theme of The Fundamentals was that the Bible is the inerrant word of God. Associated with this idea was the view that the Bible should be read literally whenever possible and that believers should lead their lives according to the moral precepts it contains, especially the Ten Commandments.

Fundamentalists opposed the teaching of the theory of biological evolution in the public schools and supported the temperance movement against the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor. Nevertheless, for much of the 20th century, Christian fundamentalism in the United States was not primarily a political movement. Indeed, from the late 1920s until the late 1970s, most Christian fundamentalists avoided the political arena, which they viewed as a sinful domain controlled by non-Christians. (Christian fundamentalists, like Evangelicals in general, reserve the term Christian for those who have been born again by accepting Jesus Christ as their Saviour.) A basic theme of Christian fundamentalism, especially in its early years, was the doctrine of separation: real Christians must remain separate from the impure and corrupt world of those who have not been born again.

The apolitical attitude of many Christian fundamentalists was linked to their premillennial eschatology, including the belief that Jesus Christ will return to initiate the millennium, a thousand-year period of perfect peace (see millennialism). There is no point in trying to reform the world, according to the premillennialists, because it is doomed until Jesus returns and defeats the Antichrist. This attitude is reflected in the fundamentalist expression Why polish the brass on a sinking ship? In contrast, postmillennialists believed that spiritual and moral reform would lead to the millennium, after which Christ would return. Thus, whereas premillennialism implied political passivity, postmillennialism implied political activism.

Belief and practice, however, do not always coincide. Starting in the late 1970s, many premillennialist fundamentalists embraced the political activism traditionally associated with postmillennialism, which resulted in a distinct tension between their political acts and their eschatological beliefs. This tension was often pointed out by more-traditional fundamentalists, who continued to shun political activism.

Despite the prominence of the Christian Right in American politics in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, millions of Christian fundamentalists continued to focus their attention on the religious and personal domains. They were not overtly political, and they certainly did not attempt to remake state and society according to biblical precepts. Even those who were politically active tended to be concerned with moral issuessuch as abortion, school prayer, and homosexualityrather than with the goal of transforming the United States into a Christian theocracy. Thus, they were not fundamentalists in the sense in which Marty and Appleby and most scholars of fundamentalism used that term. (Some Christian fundamentalists in the United States, the Christian Reconstructionists, advocated the creation of a state and society based on strict conformity to biblical law. But they constituted only a small minority of the activists in the Christian Right.)

The negative connotations of the term fundamentalism led some politically active Christian fundamentalists to search for other names for their movement. Thus, some preferred to call themselves Christian conservatives. Many members of the Christian Coalition, the most influential organization of the Christian Right in the 1990sincluding its one-time president Pat Robertsonidentified themselves as charismatic Evangelicals (see Evangelical church). Although charismatics also believed in the inerrancy of the Bible, they stressed the ecstatic experience of the Holy Spirit as manifested by speaking in tongues and faith healing. The charismatics were opposed by more-traditional fundamentalists, such as the televangelist Jerry Falwell, who proudly retained the older designation and condemned the charismatics ecstatic practices. Traditional fundamentalists viewed the charismatic emphasis on speaking in tongues and healing as unscriptural. The tension between these two distinct trends in American Christian fundamentalism is one reason relatively few fundamentalists supported Robertsons presidential candidacy in 1988.

The Christian Right that emerged with the formation of Falwells Moral Majority in 1979 was a response to transformations in American society and culture that took place in the 1960s and 70s. Fundamentalists were alarmed by a number of developments that, in their view, threatened to undermine the countrys traditional moral values. These included the civil rights movement, the womens movement (see also feminism), and the gay rights movement; the relatively permissive sexual morality prevalent among young people; the teaching of evolution; and rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court that banned institutionally initiated group prayer and reading of the Bible in public schools and that affirmed the legal right to abortion (see also Roe v. Wade). The federal governments attempts to revoke the tax-exempt status of many Christian schools founded to circumvent the federally mandated racial integration of public schools further galvanized many Christian fundamentalists in the South.

The fundamentalists were subsequently joined in their political activism by conservative Roman Catholics and Mormons as well as a small number of Orthodox Jews. The term Catholic fundamentalism is sometimes used to describe conservative Catholicism, but most scholars would reject this term because Christian fundamentalism traditionally involved strict conformity to the inerrant text of the Bible. This is not a distinctive feature of Catholic conservatism. Catholic conservatives have, for example, put much less emphasis on the issue of evolution than have Protestant fundamentalists. Moreover, Christian fundamentalists have generally viewed both Roman Catholicism and Mormonism as non-Christian cults. Conservative Catholics, Mormons, and Orthodox Jews, however, tend to agree with Protestant fundamentalists on issues like abortion, gay rights, and traditional moral values in general.

Christian Evangelicals, who represented roughly 25 percent of the U.S. population at the start of the 21st century, do not uniformly share all the views of fundamentalists or the Christian Right. (Although all Christian fundamentalists are Evangelicals, many Evangelicals are not fundamentalists.) All Evangelicals believe that the Bible is in some sense the inerrant word of God and that one has to accept Jesus Christ as ones Lord and Saviour in order to be saved. But many Evangelicals, like former president Jimmy Carter, are religious liberals who take relatively less-traditional positions on some of the issues that have enraged fundamentalists. Unlike fundamentalists, for example, many Evangelicals accept the idea of women ministers.

Christian fundamentalism has not been as politically significant elsewhere in the world as it has been in the United States. Although it has been associated with Protestant loyalism in Northern Ireland, the fundamentalist impulse in that conflict is clearly subordinate to its ethnic and nationalist dimensions, with Protestantism and Roman Catholicism serving primarily as badges of group identity.

Three main trends in Israeli Judaism have been characterized as fundamentalist: militant religious Zionism, the ultra-Orthodoxy of the Ashkenazim (Jews of eastern European origin), and the ultra-Orthodoxy of the Sephardim (Jews of Middle Eastern origin) as represented by the Shas party. All three groups stress the need for strict conformity to the religious laws and moral precepts contained in the sacred Jewish texts, the Torah and the Talmud.

The fundamentalist impulse in Israel is rooted in events that took place well before the countrys founding in 1948. Since the destruction of Jerusalems Second Temple by the Romans in 70 ce (see Jerusalem, Temple of), most Jews had lived in the Diasporathat is, dispersed far from the land of Israel promised by God to the Jewish people according to the Hebrew Bible. During their prolonged exile (Hebrew: galut), Jews all over the world prayed daily for the coming of the messiah, who would lead them back to Israel and deliver them from their Gentile oppressors. In the late 19th century, some Jews, primarily secular intellectuals such as Theodor Herzl (18601904), a Viennese journalist and playwright, concluded that the ancient problem of anti-Semitism could be solved only by the creation of a Jewish state. Zionism, the movement to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, thus represented a secularization of the traditional messianic theme. Instead of waiting for God and the messiah to lead the Jews back to the land of Israel, Zionists argued, Jews should take it upon themselves to return there. For Herzl and his closest associates, the messianic aspect of this ingathering of the exiles was irrelevant: the crucial point was to create a state where Jews would no longer be at the mercy of non-Jews.

Most Orthodox Jewsand Orthodox rabbis in particularwere opposed to Zionism, primarily because, in their view, it called upon humans to do what only God and the messiah could do. In traditional Judaism, the return to the land of Israel was inseparable from the messianic redemption of the people of Israel. Thus, returning to the land and creating a state would amount to defying Gods will and would only postpone the real redemption and the real ingathering of exiles. Orthodox Jews also objected to the fact that Herzl and most other early Zionist leaders did not advocate a state based on strict conformity to Jewish religious law. Hostility toward Zionism prevailed among Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox rabbis through the early 20th century. However, it virtually disappeared among the former with the coming of the Holocaust, which appeared to confirm the Zionist argument that Jews could be safe only in their own state.

Modern Orthodox Jews strictly observe Jewish religious law but have nevertheless devised ways to participate in modern society, both in the Diaspora and in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox, in contrast, insist on separating themselves from Gentile society, as well as from Jews who do not follow the religious law as strictly as they do.

Despite the hostility of most Orthodox rabbis, Zionism aroused considerable enthusiasm among many Orthodox Jews who saw in it the promise of the long-awaited messianic redemption. Some Orthodox rabbis, therefore, sought to legitimate Orthodox participation in the Zionist movement. Rabbi Yitzaq Yaaqov Reines (18391915), founder of the Mizrai religious Zionist movement in 1902, argued that the Zionist settlement of the land of Israel had nothing to do with the future messianic redemption of the Jews and thus did not constitute a heretical defiance of Gods will. Zionisms manifestly messianic implications, however, limited the appeal of this idea, which was soon displaced by a radically different view: that Zionism itself was part of the gradual messianic redemption of the Jewish people. The secular Zionists, though they did not know it, were doing the work of God and the messiah. This argument was made by Rabbi Abraham Kook (18651935), and it has remained a basic theme of religious Zionism.

Religious Zionists are usually referred to as the datim leumim (Hebrew: national religious). This term captures the fusion of Orthodoxy and nationalism that has always characterized the movement. Unlike the ultra-Orthodox, the religious Zionists have always been willing to cooperate with the far more numerous secular Zionists who were primarily responsible for creating the State of Israel in 1948. Indeed, from 1948 to 1992, religious-Zionist parties participated in every Israeli government. Until 1977 there was a close relationship between these parties and the Israel Labour Party, which dominated Israeli politics during this period. In 1956 Mizrai and ha-Poel ha-Mizrai (the Mizrai Worker Party) joined to form the National Religious Party (NRP), or Mafdal. Traditionally, the NRP and its predecessors concerned themselves with domestic religious issues, such as observance of Shabbat (the Sabbath) and the question of who is a Jew, and left foreign affairs to the Labour Party.

The Six-Day War of 1967 (see Arab-Israeli wars) awakened the dormant messianic dimension of religious Zionism. East Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, and Judaeathe very heart of ancient Israelwere once again in Jewish hands. To return any of this land to the Arabs would be to defy Gods plan for the redemption of the Jewish people. The religious Zionists who felt this way (not all did) began to settle in the territories occupiedor, as they saw it, liberatedin the Six-Day War.

The militant religious Zionists in the vanguard of the settlement effort formed a movement called Gush Emunim (Hebrew: Bloc of the Faithful), which clashed with the more traditional religious Zionists who still led the NRP in the 1960s and 70s. The latter continued to believe that God had given the land of Israel to the Jews, but they felt that making peaceand thus saving Jewish liveswas more important than retaining territory. For the militants, settling the land and preventing the government from withdrawing from it took precedence over anything else. In 2005 settlers staged widespread protests in a vain attempt to halt Israels withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Their prediction that such a withdrawal would provoke civil war was wrong. Some Israelis hope that the experience in Gaza will facilitate future Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank (Judaea and Samaria).

Militant religious Zionism thus illustrates the diverse character of fundamentalism. Its practitioners conform strictly in their daily lives to what they believe are the laws of God, and they advocate the creation of a society based on those laws, but their political activities have been directed toward settling and retaining the land won in 1967. Militant religious Zionists share with other religious and secular Zionists a nationalist sentiment and the conviction that anti-Semitism can be effectively opposed only with force. Indeed, religious Zionism draws upon some basic themes of mainstream Zionism, notably the idea that the goal of Zionism is to create a new Jew who will never submit to oppression.

The ultra-Orthodox are often referred to in Hebrew as Haredim, or those who tremble in the presence of God (because they are God-fearing). Unlike the Orthodox, the ultra-Orthodox continue to reject Zionismat least in principleas blasphemous. In practice, the rejection of Zionism has led to the emergence of a wide variety of groups, ranging from the Neturei Karta (Aramaic: Guardians of the City), which does not recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel, to the political parties of the Haredim, which occasionally determine which of Israels major parties is able to form a government. It is important to distinguish between the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox and the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox. The term Ashkenazi (plural Ashkenazim) originally referred to Jews from Germany, and Sephardi (plural Sephardim) originally referred to Jews from Spain and Portugal. But in Israel the terms are often used to designate Jews of northern European origin on the one hand and Jews of Middle Eastern origin on the other.

The Ashkenazi Haredi political parties have concentrated primarily on obtaining funding for their communities and on enforcing strict conformity to their interpretation of Jewish religious law concerning issues such as observance of Shabbat, conversion, kosher dietary laws, and, in their view, the desecration of the dead by archaeologists. Since the Six-Day War, however, most Ashkenazi Haredim have tended to support the position of the militant religious Zionists against land for peace, despite their continued theoretical opposition to Zionism and the state it produced.

The third major form of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel is represented by the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox and their political party, ShasShas being a Hebrew acronym for Sephardi Torah Guardians. The Sephardim, in the broad sense of Jews of Middle Eastern origin, are, by and large, less well-educated and less prosperous than the Ashkenazim, and many of them feel that they are discriminated against. Indeed, the Sephardim who vote for Shas tend to be motivated less by belief in the partys program of strict conformity to Jewish religious law than by frustration and resentment caused by their perceived second-class status in Israeli society. Shas is thus an excellent illustration of the fact that fundamentalist movements often owe their success to political and social grievances rather than to strictly religious ones. In addition to its religious and cultural platform, Shas provides schools and other social services for poor Sephardim; in this respect it is similar to some Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Because the term fundamentalism is Christian in origin, because it carries negative connotations, and because its use in an Islamic context emphasizes the religious roots of the phenomenon while neglecting the nationalistic and social grievances that underlie it, many scholars prefer to call Islamic fundamentalists Islamists and to speak of Islamist movements instead of Islamic fundamentalism. (The members of these movements refer to themselves simply as Muslims.) Nevertheless, the term Islamic fundamentalism has been current in both popular and scholarly literature since the late 20th century. This article, therefore, will occasionally follow this common usage.

The subject of Islamic fundamentalism attracted a great deal of attention in the West after the Iranian Revolution of 197879which deposed Irans ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (191980), and established an Islamic republicand especially after the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001 by al-Qaeda, an international Islamist terrorist network. The spectacular nature of these events may have lent plausibility to the common but mistaken belief in the West that Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are closely connected, if not identical. In fact, however, not all Muslims believe that the Qurn is the literal and inerrant word of God, nor do all of them believe that Islam requires strict conformity to all the religious and moral precepts in the Qurn. More important, unlike genuine Islamic fundamentalists, most Muslims are not ideologically committed to the idea of a state and society based on Islamic religious law.

The character of Islamist movements varies greatly throughout the world. Some Islamists resort to terrorism, and some do not. Some espouse leftist political and economic programs, borrowing ideas from Marxism and other varieties of socialism, while others are more conservative. Most Islamists, however, insist on conformity to a code of conduct based on a literal interpretation of sacred scripture. They also insist that religion encompasses all aspects of life and hence that religion and politics cannot be separated. Like most fundamentalists, they generally have a Manichaean (dualistic) worldview: they believe that they are engaged in a holy war, or jihad, against their evil enemies, whom they often portray as pawns of Jewish and Masonic conspiracies in terms taken directly from the anti-Semitic literature of 20th-century Europe. Messianism, which plays an important role in Christian, Jewish, and Shite Islamic fundamentalism, is less important in the fundamentalism of the Sunni branch of Islam.

Islamist movements have been politically significant in most Muslim countries primarily because they articulate political and social grievances better than do the established secular parties, some of which (the leftist parties) were discredited following the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 199091. Although the governments of Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf region have represented themselves as conforming strictly to Islamic law, they continue to face internal opposition from Islamist movements for their pro-Western political and economic policies, the extreme concentration of their countries wealth in the hands of the ruling families, and, in the Islamists view, the rulers immoral lifestyles.

To some extent, the Islamists hostility toward the West is symptomatic of the rejection of modernity attributed to all fundamentalist movements, since much of what is modern is derived from the West. (It should be noted, however, that Islamists do not reject modern technology.) But it would be a mistake to reduce all such hostility to a reactionary rejection of all that is new; it would also be a mistake to attribute it entirely to xenophobia, though this is certainly an influence. Another important factor is the Islamists resentment of Western political and economic domination of the Middle East. This is well illustrated by the writings of Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, which repeatedly condemn the United States for enabling the dispossession of the Palestinians, for orchestrating international sanctions on Iraq that contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens in the 1990s, and for maintaining a military occupation of Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War (199091). Bin Laden has also condemned the Saudi regime and most other governments of the Middle East for serving the interests of the United States rather than those of the Islamic world. Thus, the fundamentalist dimension of bin Ladens worldview is interwoven with resentment of Western domination.

Puritanical revivalist movements calling for a return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet Muhammad have occurred periodically throughout Islamic history. During the period of European colonial rule in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, these movements began to take on a polemical, apologetic character. Muslim reformists such as Muammad Abduh (18491905) and Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn (183897) stressed that a return to the rationalist Islam of Muhammadwhich was not incompatible, in their view, with science and democracywas essential if Muslims were to free themselves from European domination. This argument was subsequently adopted by some Islamic fundamentalists, though many others condemned democracy on the grounds that only Gods laws are legitimate. Some Jewish and Christian fundamentalists have rejected democracy for the same reason.

Among the Islamist movements that have attracted the most attention in the West is the Palestinian movement ams, which was founded in 1987. Its name, which means zeal in Arabic, is an acronym of the name arakat al-Muqwamah al-Islmiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement). ams was created primarily to resist what most Palestinians viewed as the occupation of their land by Israel. There is thus a clearly nationalist dimension to this movement, though it is also committed to the creation of a strictly Islamic state. ams opposed the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and insisted on fighting a jihad to expel the Israelis from all of Palestinefrom the Jordan River to the Mediterranean and from Lebanon to Egypt. It justified its terrorist attacks on Israelis as legitimate acts of war against an occupying power. Like some other Islamist movements in the Middle East, ams provides basic social servicesincluding schools, clinics, and food for the unemployedthat are not provided, or are inadequately provided, by local authorities. These charitable activities are an important source of its appeal among the Palestinian population.

In January 2006 ams was the victor by a wide margin in elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, and it was asked to form a government. This development led to much speculation among political observers about whether ams could evolve into a moderate nonviolent political party, as many other terrorist groups have done (e.g., Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang in Israel and the Irish Republican Army in Ireland).

Sikh fundamentalism first attracted attention in the West in 1978, when the fiery preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale reportedly led a march to break up a gathering of the Sikh Nirankari movement (from Punjabi nirankar, formless, reflecting the movements belief in the nature of God), which orthodox Sikhs considered heretical. Bhindranwale, like other fundamentalists, stressed the need for conformity to a sacred text (the Adi Granth) and for the creation of a Sikh state governed according to sacred law. But, as in the case of the Protestants of Northern Ireland, such fundamentalist concerns were subordinated to nationalistic ones. Sikh fundamentalists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries sought to create an independent Sikh state in the Indian province of Punjab. Although images of holy war pervaded their rhetoric, their primary enemy was the Hindu state of India rather than secularism per se. Sikh fundamentalism was thus primarily a nationalistic separatist movement.

In June 1984, Indian troops stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar and killed Bhindranwale and hundreds of his armed supporters. The assassination, as well as what Sikhs considered the desecration of their holiest shrine, infuriated the Sikh community and led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Indias prime minister, by two of her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984. This in turn sparked riots in which Hindu mobs killed more than 2,000 Sikhs. By the early 1990s, the central government had succeeded in crushing Sikh militancy in India.

What is usually called Hindu fundamentalism in India has been influenced more by nationalism than by religion, in part because Hinduism does not have a specific sacred text to which conformity can be demanded. Moreover, conformity to a religious code has never been of particular importance to Hindu groups such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). For the members of such groups, Hinduism is above all a symbol of national identity rather than a set of rules to be obeyed.

The nationalistic orientation of the BJP is reflected in its name, which means the Party of the Indian People. Similarly, the name of the Rashtriya Swayamesevak Sangh (RSS), a self-defense force associated with the BJP, means National Volunteers Corps. Neither the BJP nor the RSS advocates the creation of a Hindu state. The principal concern of both groups is the danger posed to the Hindu nation by Islamic proselytization among the Scheduled Castes (formerly untouchables) and lower-caste Hindus; both groups have also vehemently opposed Christian proselytization in India for the same reason. In RSS tracts, there is little reference to specific Hindu beliefs, and its members acknowledge that they are not themselves religious.

The nationalism of the BJP and the RSS is also reflected in their religious and moral demands; in this respect they differ significantly from Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States. In a notorious incident in 1992, the Babri Mosjid (Mosque of Bbur) at Ayodhya was demolished by a mob of Hindu nationalists; the subsequent rioting led to the deaths of more than 1,000 people. Although there was real religious fervour associated with the belief that the site of the mosque was the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama and the location of an ancient Hindu temple, the attack was above all a reflection of the Hindu nationalists belief in the essentially Hindu character of India and their perception of Muslims as inherently alien. The fact that Hindu nationalism is sometimes called Hindu fundamentalism illustrates how indiscriminately the term fundamentalism has been used outside its original American Protestant context.

Although the terms fundamentalism and fundamentalist have entered common parlance and are now broadly applied, it should not be forgotten that the myriad movements so designated vary greatly in their origins, character, and outlook. Thus, Islamic fundamentalist movements differ from their Christian and Jewish counterparts in having begun as essentially defensive responses to European colonial domination. Early Islamic fundamentalists were reformers who wished to affirm the value of their religion by returning to what they sought to portray as its pristine original form; their movements only gradually acquired the militancy characteristic of much religious fundamentalism today. On the other hand, these movements share with Christian and Jewish fundamentalism an antipathy to secularism, an emphasis on the importance of traditional religiosity as their members understand it, and a strict adherence to sacred texts and the moral codes built upon them. Although these and other common features are important as sources of insight, each fundamentalist movement is in fact unique and is best understood when viewed in its own historical and cultural context.

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David Pawson – Biblical Christian Zionism

There is a rising tide of anti-semitism in British churches. Christian Zionists are charged with being politically dangerous, supporting an occupying oppressor in the Middle East and threatening world peace. They are also said to be theologically heretical for two reasons.On the one hand, they teach the very opposite of Replacement theology (the notion that the church has replaced Israel as Gods people to achieve his purpose) which has been part of Christian tradition for centuries. On the other hand, the Zionist conviction that God has brought Israel back to her own land in our day has become entangled with Dispensational theology, which is largely discredited in Britain but still widely held in America.These three talks are an integral series, aiming to lay a foundation for Biblical Christian Zionism in the New Testament. They expose the differences between this and both Replacement and Dispensational viewpoints, one too anti-Israel and the other too pro-Israel. Given in March 2007

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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 – Wikipedia

UN General AssemblyResolution 3379Date10 November 1975Meetingno.2400CodeA/RES/3379(Document)SubjectElimination of all forms of racial discrimination

Voting summary

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on 10 November 1975 by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions), “determine[d] that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”. The vote took place approximately one year after UNGA 3237 granted the PLO “observer status”, following PLO president Yasser Arafat’s “olive branch” speech to the General Assembly in November 1974. The resolution was passed with the support of the Soviet bloc and other then Soviet-aligned nations, in addition to the Arab and Muslim majority countries.

The determination that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”, contained in the resolution, was revoked in 1991 with UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86.[1]

In July 1920, at the San Remo conference, a Class “A” League of Nations mandates over Palestine was allocated to the British. The preamble of the mandate document declared:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[2]

On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending “to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union” as Resolution 181 (II).[3] The plan contained a proposal to terminate the British Mandate for Palestine and partition Palestine into “independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.” On 14 May 1948, the day on which the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People’s Council gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum, and approved a proclamation which declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.[4]

On 11 May 1949, Israel was admitted to membership in the United Nations.[5]

The full text of Resolution 3379:[6]

3379 (XXX). Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that “any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous” and its expression of alarm at “the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures”,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that “international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination”,

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered “that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being”,

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly the same day, 10 November 1975, Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog stated:[7]

“I can point with pride to the Arab ministers who have served in my government; to the Arab deputy speaker of my Parliament; to Arab officers and men serving of their own volition in our border and police defense forces, frequently commanding Jewish troops; to the hundreds of thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East crowding the cities of Israel every year; to the thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East coming for medical treatment to Israel; to the peaceful coexistence which has developed; to the fact that Arabic is an official language in Israel on a par with Hebrew; to the fact that it is as natural for an Arab to serve in public office in Israel as it is incongruous to think of a Jew serving in any public office in an Arab country, indeed being admitted to many of them. Is that racism? It is not! That … is Zionism.”

In his response he also said that the resolution was:

“another manifestation of the bitter anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish hatred which animates Arab society. Who would have believed that in this year, 1975, the malicious falsehoods of the ‘Elders of Zion’ would be distributed officially by Arab governments? Who would have believed that we would today contemplate an Arab society which teaches the vilest anti-Jewish hate in the kindergartens? … We are being attacked by a society which is motivated by the most extreme form of racism known in the world today”

Herzog ended his statement, while holding a copy of the resolution, with these words:

“For us, the Jewish people, this resolution based on hatred, falsehood and arrogance, is devoid of any moral or legal value. For us, the Jewish people, this is no more than a piece of paper and we shall treat it as such.”

As he concluded his speech, Herzog tore the resolution in half.

The name of “The UN avenue” in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv was switched to “The Zionism avenue” as a response to the UN’s decision.[8]

Before the vote, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, warned that, “The United Nations is about to make anti-Semitism international law.”[9] He delivered a speech against the resolution, including the famous line, “[The United States] does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act … A great evil has been loosed upon the world.”[10]

In Campbell, California, in the United States, a group of high school students attempted to solicit signatures on the premises of a local shopping center for a petition against Resolution 3379. The result was the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) that supported states’ rights to expand the exercise of free speech, which California held was legal in what were considered public areas of a shopping mall.[11]

Mexico’s vote in favor of the resolution led some United States Jews to organize a tourism boycott of Mexico. This ended after Mexican foreign minister Emilio scar Rabasa made a trip to Israel (Rabasa shortly afterward was forced to resign).[12][13]

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/86, adopted on 16 December 1991, revoked the determination in Resolution 3379, which had called Zionism a form of racism.[1] Israel had made revocation of Resolution 3379 a condition of its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, in progress in the last quarter of 1991.[15]

The resolution was raised under pressure from the administration of US President George H.W. Bush.[16] The text of the revocation was simply:

“The General Assembly Decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.”

The motion was supported by 111 (including the 90 nations who sponsored the resolution), opposed by 25 nations and abstained by 13 nations.

George H. W. Bush personally introduced the motion to revoke 3379 with these words:

And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to fulfill the U.N. Charter’s ambition of working “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and small to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Those are the words from the charter. We will not revive these ideals if we fail to acknowledge the challenge that the renewal of history presents.

….No one here can promise that today’s borders will remain fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful, negotiated settlement of border disputes. We also must promote the cause of international harmony by addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the charter’s pledge “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.”

UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called “Zionism is racism” resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal. Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the State of Israel. And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself, a member of good standing of the United Nations.

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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 – Wikipedia

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When Zionism is the essence of life, a break has huge …

Breaking with Zionism can be a life-shattering experience.

In Israel, the Jewish-Israeli society is by and large Zionist in degrees varying from the so-called liberal-Zionist to the fundamentalist Zionist. There is not really, necessarily, much of a difference when one speaks of this breaking experience in one faction or the other.

The thing with Zionism is, that its adherents basically see it as a kind of essence of life. The Zionist indoctrination teaches that its about our very existence. The us is generally considered to be the Jewish nation or the Jewish people, and hence the individual is seen as a small part in this. As the survival of the whole also encompasses the individual, any breaking with Zionism is considered a kind of societal treachery, which endangers the strength and even survival of the whole.

Narratives challenging the factual veracity of the survival notion, like pointing out the thriving Jewish existence elsewhere, is rather meaningless for Zionists. Under the Zionist meta-narrative, this is all temporary. Jewish thriving is temporary, and simply awaits a point in time wherein the gentiles will again turn on the Jews, because thats what happens in each and every generation, as the Passover chant goes.

And the Zionist answer to this supposedly perilous, eternal state of affairs, is a Jewish nation-state. So in the bigger paradigm, Zionists simply see the solution the Jewish nation-state, as a survivalist solution. They are therefore not inclined to see any problems ensuing from it, such as human rights violations and challenging of international law, as more than mere obstacles or challenges facing this special case Israel.

So when one points out these violations, this is an irritation for Zionists not necessarily because they are not aware of them but because by pointing them out, one is not showing sympathy with the challenges facing the special case that Israel is, for them.

Since the case of Israel and Zionism needs a special dispensation, even an individuals emotional breaking with Zionism can be perceived as a danger. And when one thus breaks with Zionism, it is seen in highly emotional, personal terms by those for whom it represents the essence of life.

That one then characterizes this kind of allegiance to the Zionist essence of life, as a kind of fascist adherence reminiscent of totalitarian societies, does nothing to add understanding amongst ones peers. It merely adds insult to injury for them.

Furthermore, the talk about the intrinsic violation of human rights inherent in Zionism is only offensive to Zionists, and here particularly to the liberal Zionists, since it suggests that the whole grand ideology which they subscribe to is irreconcilable with values of equality and even democracy. Natasha Roth makes an eloquent summation of this in her article concerning the recent Israeli blacklist of BDS activists. Roth writes:

The Israeli government apparently considers the banning of BDS activists acceptable behavior for a democracy, a view facilitated by its having very diligently cultivated and promoted the lie that BDS is an anti-Semitic movement aimed at destroying Israel. This lie has been remarkably successful, despite the clear statement on the official website of the BDS movement that its goal is to secure the same human and civil rights for Palestinians as everyone else living in Israeli-controlled territory. But if granting equal rights to everyone who lives in the territory controlled by Israel will cause the state to implode, then surely those who oppose BDS on those grounds are ignoring a fundamental problem that a state which cannot survive if all its residents have equal rights is by definition not a democracy.

In other words, Zionism renders the supposed values of liberalism meaningless. It may well be that liberal Zionists consider liberal values to be their highest goal, but when it comes down to the competition between Zionism and liberalism, Zionists will go Zionist. Where the more fundamentalist and more unabashed fascist Zionists are concerned, this is less of an affront, because they have less of an inclination to respect the liberal notion anyway. But even fascists tend to think that their values are related to freedom and moral superiority they simply judge the others to not be part of the club.

So when the break occurs, it is a break that will inevitably lead one to reconsider the totality of the indoctrination and set of values one was brought up with. One ends up having to question the nature of those values, inasmuch as they hold up such a construct Zionism to be the essence of life. If one had thought that one was brought up on values of respect, one has to then mirror that claim against the intrinsic disrespect of Zionism towards the native others Palestinians. If this mirror does not bear the picture, if this disrespect a genocidal one, let it be noted cannot be reconciled with respect, the mirror shatters. One has to re-educate and re-assemble ones whole set of values to establish a new and real concept of respect. This example pertains to a long list of values.

Thus the breaking with Zionism becomes a core breaking by oneself with a whole value-system with which one was raised. Ones family and peers register that ones distance is not merely political; it is, inevitably, about ones essential nature of being. Zionists perceive this as a suggestion that they, the Zionists, are regarded as others of lesser values, and instinctively register that regard as an offense, even throwing them back to the anti-Semitic idea of Jews as lesser beings (even when it is a Jew breaking with Zionism). This is offensive to a Zionists whole being, on so many levels. They will inevitably feel a natural aversion to the person.

The solution to this aversion, if the people still want to deal with one another, might simply be avoiding the topic as much as possible. But the knowing will be there. It will be like an elephant in the room, the one we cant talk about Zionism.

People who are in such a society the one which upholds and enshrines Zionism know all this instinctively. The price of breaking with it can be high. Its not only a breaking with society, its a breaking with ones past. For most people, such a price is considered simply too high. But those who have realized that Palestinians are paying and have paid an incomparably high price for Zionism may find the price very tolerable and worthy. The intrinsic and general Zionist denial of Palestinian suffering is a part of this mechanism. If you deny it, and cannot feel it, then you can keep the mask, keep your self-righteousness, and keep the belief that Zionism is the only way.

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When Zionism is the essence of life, a break has huge …

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Is Liberal Zionism Dead? – The New York Times

Not long after Trumps announcement, the central committee of the ruling Likud Party passed a resolution calling for the de facto annexation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Knesset passed an amendment requiring a supermajority to give up Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, making a peace deal with the Palestinians even more elusive.

Mustafa Barghouti, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organizations central council, told me that before Trumps decision, there was a frozen peace process, but many people believed it could be restarted. Mr. Trump killed the potential, he said.

This appears to have been intentional. Writing in Fire and Fury, his new book about the Trump administration, Michael Wolff quotes Steve Bannon boasting about the implications of moving the embassy to Jerusalem, which Bannon treated as a death knell to Palestinian national aspirations. We know where were heading on this, Bannon reportedly said to the ousted Fox News chief executive Roger Ailes. Let Jordan take the West Bank, let Egypt take Gaza.

Despite Bannons Great Game fantasies, thats not going to happen. Instead, if the possibility of Palestinian statehood is foreclosed, Israel will be responsible for all the territory under its control. There will be one state; the question is what sort of state it will be. Some on the Israeli right foresee a system in which most Palestinians will remain stateless indefinitely, living under a set of laws different from those governing Israeli citizens. Yoav Kish, a Likud member of Parliament, has drawn up a plan in which Palestinians in the West Bank will have limited local administrative sovereignty; rather than citizens they will be Residents of the Autonomy. Supporters of Israel hate it when people use the word apartheid to describe the country, but we dont have another term for a political system in which one ethnic group rules over another, confining it to small islands of territory and denying it full political representation.

The word apartheid will become increasingly inescapable as a small but growing number of Palestinians turn from fighting for independence to demanding equal rights in the system they are living under. If the Israelis insist now on finishing the process of killing the two-state solution, the only alternative we have as Palestinians is one fully democratic, one-state solution, Barghouti says, in which everyone has totally equal rights.

Needless to say, Israel will accept no such thing. Though demographics in the region are as contested as everything else, Palestinians are likely to soon become a majority of the population in Israel and the occupied territories. If all of them were given the right to vote, Israel would cease to be a Jewish state.

But most of the world including most of the Jewish diaspora will have a hard time coming up with a decent justification for opposing a Palestinian campaign for equal rights. Israels apologists will be left mimicking the argument that William F. Buckley once made about the Jim Crow South. In 1957, he asked rhetorically whether the white South was entitled to prevail politically and culturally, in areas in which it does not predominate numerically. The sobering answer, he concluded, was yes, given the white communitys superior civilization.

Its impossible to say how long Israel could sustain such a system. But the dream of liberal Zionism would be dead. Maybe, with the far right in power both here and there, it already is.

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Zionism – Facts & Summary – HISTORY.com

Since it started more than 120 years ago, Zionism has evolved, and different ideologiespolitical, religious and culturalwithin the Zionist movement have emerged.

Many self-proclaimed Zionists disagree with each other about fundamental principles. Some followers of Zionism are devoutly religious while others are more secular.

Zionist lefts typically want a less-religious government and support giving up some Israeli-controlled land in exchange for peace with Arab nations. Zionist rights defend their rights to land and prefer a government based strongly on Jewish religious traditions.

Advocates of the Zionist movement see it as an important effort to offer refuge to persecuted minorities and reestablish settlements in Israel. Critics, however, say its an extreme ideology that discriminates against non-Jews.

For example, under Israels 1950 Law of Return, Jews born anywhere in the world have the right to become an Israeli citizen, while other people arent granted this privilege.

Arabs and Palestinians living in and around Israel typically oppose Zionism. Many international Jews also disapprove of the movement because they dont believe a national homeland is essential to their religion.

While this controversial movement continues to face criticism and challenges, theres no denying that Zionism has successfully bolstered the Jewish population in Israel.

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Zionism | Definition of Zionism by Merriam-Webster

: an international movement originally for the establishment of a Jewish national or religious community in Palestine and later for the support of modern Israel 1896, in the meaning defined above More Definitions for Zionism Comments on Zionism What made you want to look up Zionism? Please tell us where you read or heard it (including the quote, if possible).

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Zionism – definition of Zionism by The Free Dictionary

A political movement that supports the maintenance and preservation of the state of Israel as a Jewish homeland, originally arising in the late 1800s with the goal of reestablishing a Jewish homeland in the region of Palestine. Zionist adj. & n. Zionistic adj. 1. (Judaism) a political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, now concerned chiefly with the development of the modern state of Israel 2. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) a political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, now concerned chiefly with the development of the modern state of Israel 3. (Judaism) a policy or movement for Jews to return to Palestine from the Diaspora 4. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) a policy or movement for Jews to return to Palestine from the Diaspora Zionist n, adj Zionistic adj n. a worldwide Jewish movement for the establishment and development of the state of Israel. [18951900] Zionist, n., adj. Zi`onistic, adj. a worldwide Jewish movement for the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for Jews. Zionist, Zionite, n. Zionist, Zionistic, adj. ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend: Translations cionizam Want to thank TFD for its existence? Tell a friend about us, add a link to this page, or visit the webmaster’s page for free fun content. Link to this page:

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Zionism: Is Zionism Racism? – Jewish Virtual Library

In 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution slandering Zionism by equating it with racism. In his spirited response to the resolution, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Chaim Herzog noted the irony of the timing, the vote coming exactly 37 years after Kristallnacht. Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, which holds that Jews, like any other nation, are entitled to a homeland. History has demonstrated the need to ensure Jewish security through a national homeland. Zionism recognizes that Jewishness is defined by shared origin, religion, culture and history. The realization of the Zionist dream is exemplified by more than four million Jews, from more than 100 countries, including dark-skinned Jews from Ethiopia, Yemen and India, who are Israeli citizens. Approximately 1,000,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, Baha’is, Circassians and other ethnic groups also are represented in Israel’s population. Many Christians have traditionally supported the goals and ideals of Zionism. Israel’s open and democratic character and its scrupulous protection of the religious and political rights of Christians and Muslims rebut the charge of exclusivity. The Arab states define citizenship strictly by native parentage. It is almost impossible to become a naturalized citizen in many Arab states, especially Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Several Arab nations have laws that facilitate the naturalization of foreign Arabs, with the specific exception of Palestinians. Jordan, on the other hand, instituted its own “law of return” in 1954, according citizenship to all former residents of Palestine, except for Jews. The presence of thousands of black Jews in Israel is the best refutation of the calumny against Zionism. In a series of historic airlifts – labeled Operations Moses (1984), Joshua (1985) and Solomon (1991), Israel rescued almost 42,000 members of the ancient Ethiopian Jewish community. To single out Jewish self-determination for condemnation is itself a form of racism. “A world that closed its doors to Jews who sought escape from Hitler’s ovens lacks the moral standing to complain about Israel’s giving preference to Jews,” wrote noted civil rights lawyer Alan Dershowitz. When approached by a student who attacked Zionism, Martin Luther King responded: “When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti-Semitism.” The 1975 UN resolution was part of the Soviet-Arab Cold War anti-Israel campaign. Almost all the former non-Arab supporters of the resolution have apologized and changed their positions. When the General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution in 1991, only some Arab and Muslim states, as well as Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam were opposed. Below, you can listen to Chaim Herzog’s historic speech lambasting the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, and US ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s response to the resolution as well.

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Fundamentalism | religious movement | Britannica.com

Fundamentalism, type of militantly conservative religious movement characterized by the advocacy of strict conformity to sacred texts. Once used exclusively to refer to American Protestants who insisted on the inerrancy of the Bible, the term fundamentalism was applied more broadly beginning in the late 20th century to a wide variety of religious movements. Indeed, in the broad sense of the term, many of the major religions of the world may be said to have fundamentalist movements. For a discussion of fundamentalism in American Protestantism, see fundamentalism, Christian. In the late 20th century the most influentialand the most controversialstudy of fundamentalism was The Fundamentalism Project (199195), a series of five volumes edited by the American scholars Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Marty and Appleby viewed fundamentalism primarily as the militant rejection of secular modernity. They argued that fundamentalism is not just traditional religiosity but an inherently political phenomenon, though this dimension may sometimes be dormant. Marty and Appleby also contended that fundamentalism is inherently totalitarian, insofar as it seeks to remake all aspects of society and government on religious principles. Despite its unprecedented breadth, The Fundamentalism Project has been criticized on a number of grounds. One objection is that many of the movements that Marty and Appleby categorize as fundamentalist seem to be motivated less by the rejection of modernity than by social, ethnic, and nationalistic grievances. Indeed, in many cases the people who join such movements have not suffered more than others from the stress and dislocation typically associated with modernization, nor are such stresses and dislocations prominently reflected in the rhetoric or the actions of these movements. The term modernity itself, moreover, is inherently vague; Marty and Appleby, like many other scholars, use it freely but do little to explain what it means. Another criticism of Marty and Applebys approach is that it is inappropriate to use the term fundamentalism, which originally referred to a movement in American Protestantism, to describe movements in other religions, particularly non-Western ones. This practice has been denounced as a kind of Eurocentric conceptual imperialisman especially sensitive charge in the Islamic world, where those designated fundamentalists are outraged by Western political, economic, and cultural domination. A third objection is that the significant negative connotations of the term fundamentalismusually including bigotry, zealotry, militancy, extremism, and fanaticismmake it unsuitable as a category of scholarly analysis. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the negative connotations of the term aptly characterize the nature of fundamentalist movements, many of which seek the violent overthrow of national governments and the imposition of particular forms of worship and religious codes of conduct in violation of widely recognized human rights to political self-determination and freedom of worship. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Christian fundamentalists vigorously opposed theological modernism, which, as the higher criticism of the Bible, involved the attempt to reconcile traditional Christian beliefs with modern science and historiography. (For a discussion of modernism in the history of the Roman Catholic Church, see Modernism.) The term fundamentalist was coined in 1920 to describe conservative Evangelical Protestants who supported the principles expounded in The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth (191015), a series of 12 pamphlets that attacked modernist theories of biblical criticism and reasserted the authority of the Bible. The central theme of The Fundamentals was that the Bible is the inerrant word of God. Associated with this idea was the view that the Bible should be read literally whenever possible and that believers should lead their lives according to the moral precepts it contains, especially the Ten Commandments. Fundamentalists opposed the teaching of the theory of biological evolution in the public schools and supported the temperance movement against the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor. Nevertheless, for much of the 20th century, Christian fundamentalism in the United States was not primarily a political movement. Indeed, from the late 1920s until the late 1970s, most Christian fundamentalists avoided the political arena, which they viewed as a sinful domain controlled by non-Christians. (Christian fundamentalists, like Evangelicals in general, reserve the term Christian for those who have been born again by accepting Jesus Christ as their Saviour.) A basic theme of Christian fundamentalism, especially in its early years, was the doctrine of separation: real Christians must remain separate from the impure and corrupt world of those who have not been born again. The apolitical attitude of many Christian fundamentalists was linked to their premillennial eschatology, including the belief that Jesus Christ will return to initiate the millennium, a thousand-year period of perfect peace (see millennialism). There is no point in trying to reform the world, according to the premillennialists, because it is doomed until Jesus returns and defeats the Antichrist. This attitude is reflected in the fundamentalist expression Why polish the brass on a sinking ship? In contrast, postmillennialists believed that spiritual and moral reform would lead to the millennium, after which Christ would return. Thus, whereas premillennialism implied political passivity, postmillennialism implied political activism. Belief and practice, however, do not always coincide. Starting in the late 1970s, many premillennialist fundamentalists embraced the political activism traditionally associated with postmillennialism, which resulted in a distinct tension between their political acts and their eschatological beliefs. This tension was often pointed out by more-traditional fundamentalists, who continued to shun political activism. Despite the prominence of the Christian Right in American politics in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, millions of Christian fundamentalists continued to focus their attention on the religious and personal domains. They were not overtly political, and they certainly did not attempt to remake state and society according to biblical precepts. Even those who were politically active tended to be concerned with moral issuessuch as abortion, school prayer, and homosexualityrather than with the goal of transforming the United States into a Christian theocracy. Thus, they were not fundamentalists in the sense in which Marty and Appleby and most scholars of fundamentalism used that term. (Some Christian fundamentalists in the United States, the Christian Reconstructionists, advocated the creation of a state and society based on strict conformity to biblical law. But they constituted only a small minority of the activists in the Christian Right.) The negative connotations of the term fundamentalism led some politically active Christian fundamentalists to search for other names for their movement. Thus, some preferred to call themselves Christian conservatives. Many members of the Christian Coalition, the most influential organization of the Christian Right in the 1990sincluding its one-time president Pat Robertsonidentified themselves as charismatic Evangelicals (see Evangelical church). Although charismatics also believed in the inerrancy of the Bible, they stressed the ecstatic experience of the Holy Spirit as manifested by speaking in tongues and faith healing. The charismatics were opposed by more-traditional fundamentalists, such as the televangelist Jerry Falwell, who proudly retained the older designation and condemned the charismatics ecstatic practices. Traditional fundamentalists viewed the charismatic emphasis on speaking in tongues and healing as unscriptural. The tension between these two distinct trends in American Christian fundamentalism is one reason relatively few fundamentalists supported Robertsons presidential candidacy in 1988. The Christian Right that emerged with the formation of Falwells Moral Majority in 1979 was a response to transformations in American society and culture that took place in the 1960s and 70s. Fundamentalists were alarmed by a number of developments that, in their view, threatened to undermine the countrys traditional moral values. These included the civil rights movement, the womens movement (see also feminism), and the gay rights movement; the relatively permissive sexual morality prevalent among young people; the teaching of evolution; and rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court that banned institutionally initiated group prayer and reading of the Bible in public schools and that affirmed the legal right to abortion (see also Roe v. Wade). The federal governments attempts to revoke the tax-exempt status of many Christian schools founded to circumvent the federally mandated racial integration of public schools further galvanized many Christian fundamentalists in the South. The fundamentalists were subsequently joined in their political activism by conservative Roman Catholics and Mormons as well as a small number of Orthodox Jews. The term Catholic fundamentalism is sometimes used to describe conservative Catholicism, but most scholars would reject this term because Christian fundamentalism traditionally involved strict conformity to the inerrant text of the Bible. This is not a distinctive feature of Catholic conservatism. Catholic conservatives have, for example, put much less emphasis on the issue of evolution than have Protestant fundamentalists. Moreover, Christian fundamentalists have generally viewed both Roman Catholicism and Mormonism as non-Christian cults. Conservative Catholics, Mormons, and Orthodox Jews, however, tend to agree with Protestant fundamentalists on issues like abortion, gay rights, and traditional moral values in general. Christian Evangelicals, who represented roughly 25 percent of the U.S. population at the start of the 21st century, do not uniformly share all the views of fundamentalists or the Christian Right. (Although all Christian fundamentalists are Evangelicals, many Evangelicals are not fundamentalists.) All Evangelicals believe that the Bible is in some sense the inerrant word of God and that one has to accept Jesus Christ as ones Lord and Saviour in order to be saved. But many Evangelicals, like former president Jimmy Carter, are religious liberals who take relatively less-traditional positions on some of the issues that have enraged fundamentalists. Unlike fundamentalists, for example, many Evangelicals accept the idea of women ministers. Christian fundamentalism has not been as politically significant elsewhere in the world as it has been in the United States. Although it has been associated with Protestant loyalism in Northern Ireland, the fundamentalist impulse in that conflict is clearly subordinate to its ethnic and nationalist dimensions, with Protestantism and Roman Catholicism serving primarily as badges of group identity. Three main trends in Israeli Judaism have been characterized as fundamentalist: militant religious Zionism, the ultra-Orthodoxy of the Ashkenazim (Jews of eastern European origin), and the ultra-Orthodoxy of the Sephardim (Jews of Middle Eastern origin) as represented by the Shas party. All three groups stress the need for strict conformity to the religious laws and moral precepts contained in the sacred Jewish texts, the Torah and the Talmud. The fundamentalist impulse in Israel is rooted in events that took place well before the countrys founding in 1948. Since the destruction of Jerusalems Second Temple by the Romans in 70 ce (see Jerusalem, Temple of), most Jews had lived in the Diasporathat is, dispersed far from the land of Israel promised by God to the Jewish people according to the Hebrew Bible. During their prolonged exile (Hebrew: galut), Jews all over the world prayed daily for the coming of the messiah, who would lead them back to Israel and deliver them from their Gentile oppressors. In the late 19th century, some Jews, primarily secular intellectuals such as Theodor Herzl (18601904), a Viennese journalist and playwright, concluded that the ancient problem of anti-Semitism could be solved only by the creation of a Jewish state. Zionism, the movement to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, thus represented a secularization of the traditional messianic theme. Instead of waiting for God and the messiah to lead the Jews back to the land of Israel, Zionists argued, Jews should take it upon themselves to return there. For Herzl and his closest associates, the messianic aspect of this ingathering of the exiles was irrelevant: the crucial point was to create a state where Jews would no longer be at the mercy of non-Jews. Most Orthodox Jewsand Orthodox rabbis in particularwere opposed to Zionism, primarily because, in their view, it called upon humans to do what only God and the messiah could do. In traditional Judaism, the return to the land of Israel was inseparable from the messianic redemption of the people of Israel. Thus, returning to the land and creating a state would amount to defying Gods will and would only postpone the real redemption and the real ingathering of exiles. Orthodox Jews also objected to the fact that Herzl and most other early Zionist leaders did not advocate a state based on strict conformity to Jewish religious law. Hostility toward Zionism prevailed among Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox rabbis through the early 20th century. However, it virtually disappeared among the former with the coming of the Holocaust, which appeared to confirm the Zionist argument that Jews could be safe only in their own state. Modern Orthodox Jews strictly observe Jewish religious law but have nevertheless devised ways to participate in modern society, both in the Diaspora and in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox, in contrast, insist on separating themselves from Gentile society, as well as from Jews who do not follow the religious law as strictly as they do. Despite the hostility of most Orthodox rabbis, Zionism aroused considerable enthusiasm among many Orthodox Jews who saw in it the promise of the long-awaited messianic redemption. Some Orthodox rabbis, therefore, sought to legitimate Orthodox participation in the Zionist movement. Rabbi Yitzaq Yaaqov Reines (18391915), founder of the Mizrai religious Zionist movement in 1902, argued that the Zionist settlement of the land of Israel had nothing to do with the future messianic redemption of the Jews and thus did not constitute a heretical defiance of Gods will. Zionisms manifestly messianic implications, however, limited the appeal of this idea, which was soon displaced by a radically different view: that Zionism itself was part of the gradual messianic redemption of the Jewish people. The secular Zionists, though they did not know it, were doing the work of God and the messiah. This argument was made by Rabbi Abraham Kook (18651935), and it has remained a basic theme of religious Zionism. Religious Zionists are usually referred to as the datim leumim (Hebrew: national religious). This term captures the fusion of Orthodoxy and nationalism that has always characterized the movement. Unlike the ultra-Orthodox, the religious Zionists have always been willing to cooperate with the far more numerous secular Zionists who were primarily responsible for creating the State of Israel in 1948. Indeed, from 1948 to 1992, religious-Zionist parties participated in every Israeli government. Until 1977 there was a close relationship between these parties and the Israel Labour Party, which dominated Israeli politics during this period. In 1956 Mizrai and ha-Poel ha-Mizrai (the Mizrai Worker Party) joined to form the National Religious Party (NRP), or Mafdal. Traditionally, the NRP and its predecessors concerned themselves with domestic religious issues, such as observance of Shabbat (the Sabbath) and the question of who is a Jew, and left foreign affairs to the Labour Party. The Six-Day War of 1967 (see Arab-Israeli wars) awakened the dormant messianic dimension of religious Zionism. East Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, and Judaeathe very heart of ancient Israelwere once again in Jewish hands. To return any of this land to the Arabs would be to defy Gods plan for the redemption of the Jewish people. The religious Zionists who felt this way (not all did) began to settle in the territories occupiedor, as they saw it, liberatedin the Six-Day War. The militant religious Zionists in the vanguard of the settlement effort formed a movement called Gush Emunim (Hebrew: Bloc of the Faithful), which clashed with the more traditional religious Zionists who still led the NRP in the 1960s and 70s. The latter continued to believe that God had given the land of Israel to the Jews, but they felt that making peaceand thus saving Jewish liveswas more important than retaining territory. For the militants, settling the land and preventing the government from withdrawing from it took precedence over anything else. In 2005 settlers staged widespread protests in a vain attempt to halt Israels withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Their prediction that such a withdrawal would provoke civil war was wrong. Some Israelis hope that the experience in Gaza will facilitate future Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank (Judaea and Samaria). Militant religious Zionism thus illustrates the diverse character of fundamentalism. Its practitioners conform strictly in their daily lives to what they believe are the laws of God, and they advocate the creation of a society based on those laws, but their political activities have been directed toward settling and retaining the land won in 1967. Militant religious Zionists share with other religious and secular Zionists a nationalist sentiment and the conviction that anti-Semitism can be effectively opposed only with force. Indeed, religious Zionism draws upon some basic themes of mainstream Zionism, notably the idea that the goal of Zionism is to create a new Jew who will never submit to oppression. The ultra-Orthodox are often referred to in Hebrew as Haredim, or those who tremble in the presence of God (because they are God-fearing). Unlike the Orthodox, the ultra-Orthodox continue to reject Zionismat least in principleas blasphemous. In practice, the rejection of Zionism has led to the emergence of a wide variety of groups, ranging from the Neturei Karta (Aramaic: Guardians of the City), which does not recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel, to the political parties of the Haredim, which occasionally determine which of Israels major parties is able to form a government. It is important to distinguish between the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox and the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox. The term Ashkenazi (plural Ashkenazim) originally referred to Jews from Germany, and Sephardi (plural Sephardim) originally referred to Jews from Spain and Portugal. But in Israel the terms are often used to designate Jews of northern European origin on the one hand and Jews of Middle Eastern origin on the other. The Ashkenazi Haredi political parties have concentrated primarily on obtaining funding for their communities and on enforcing strict conformity to their interpretation of Jewish religious law concerning issues such as observance of Shabbat, conversion, kosher dietary laws, and, in their view, the desecration of the dead by archaeologists. Since the Six-Day War, however, most Ashkenazi Haredim have tended to support the position of the militant religious Zionists against land for peace, despite their continued theoretical opposition to Zionism and the state it produced. The third major form of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel is represented by the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox and their political party, ShasShas being a Hebrew acronym for Sephardi Torah Guardians. The Sephardim, in the broad sense of Jews of Middle Eastern origin, are, by and large, less well-educated and less prosperous than the Ashkenazim, and many of them feel that they are discriminated against. Indeed, the Sephardim who vote for Shas tend to be motivated less by belief in the partys program of strict conformity to Jewish religious law than by frustration and resentment caused by their perceived second-class status in Israeli society. Shas is thus an excellent illustration of the fact that fundamentalist movements often owe their success to political and social grievances rather than to strictly religious ones. In addition to its religious and cultural platform, Shas provides schools and other social services for poor Sephardim; in this respect it is similar to some Islamic fundamentalist movements. Because the term fundamentalism is Christian in origin, because it carries negative connotations, and because its use in an Islamic context emphasizes the religious roots of the phenomenon while neglecting the nationalistic and social grievances that underlie it, many scholars prefer to call Islamic fundamentalists Islamists and to speak of Islamist movements instead of Islamic fundamentalism. (The members of these movements refer to themselves simply as Muslims.) Nevertheless, the term Islamic fundamentalism has been current in both popular and scholarly literature since the late 20th century. This article, therefore, will occasionally follow this common usage. The subject of Islamic fundamentalism attracted a great deal of attention in the West after the Iranian Revolution of 197879which deposed Irans ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (191980), and established an Islamic republicand especially after the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001 by al-Qaeda, an international Islamist terrorist network. The spectacular nature of these events may have lent plausibility to the common but mistaken belief in the West that Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are closely connected, if not identical. In fact, however, not all Muslims believe that the Qurn is the literal and inerrant word of God, nor do all of them believe that Islam requires strict conformity to all the religious and moral precepts in the Qurn. More important, unlike genuine Islamic fundamentalists, most Muslims are not ideologically committed to the idea of a state and society based on Islamic religious law. The character of Islamist movements varies greatly throughout the world. Some Islamists resort to terrorism, and some do not. Some espouse leftist political and economic programs, borrowing ideas from Marxism and other varieties of socialism, while others are more conservative. Most Islamists, however, insist on conformity to a code of conduct based on a literal interpretation of sacred scripture. They also insist that religion encompasses all aspects of life and hence that religion and politics cannot be separated. Like most fundamentalists, they generally have a Manichaean (dualistic) worldview: they believe that they are engaged in a holy war, or jihad, against their evil enemies, whom they often portray as pawns of Jewish and Masonic conspiracies in terms taken directly from the anti-Semitic literature of 20th-century Europe. Messianism, which plays an important role in Christian, Jewish, and Shite Islamic fundamentalism, is less important in the fundamentalism of the Sunni branch of Islam. Islamist movements have been politically significant in most Muslim countries primarily because they articulate political and social grievances better than do the established secular parties, some of which (the leftist parties) were discredited following the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 199091. Although the governments of Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf region have represented themselves as conforming strictly to Islamic law, they continue to face internal opposition from Islamist movements for their pro-Western political and economic policies, the extreme concentration of their countries wealth in the hands of the ruling families, and, in the Islamists view, the rulers immoral lifestyles. To some extent, the Islamists hostility toward the West is symptomatic of the rejection of modernity attributed to all fundamentalist movements, since much of what is modern is derived from the West. (It should be noted, however, that Islamists do not reject modern technology.) But it would be a mistake to reduce all such hostility to a reactionary rejection of all that is new; it would also be a mistake to attribute it entirely to xenophobia, though this is certainly an influence. Another important factor is the Islamists resentment of Western political and economic domination of the Middle East. This is well illustrated by the writings of Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, which repeatedly condemn the United States for enabling the dispossession of the Palestinians, for orchestrating international sanctions on Iraq that contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens in the 1990s, and for maintaining a military occupation of Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War (199091). Bin Laden has also condemned the Saudi regime and most other governments of the Middle East for serving the interests of the United States rather than those of the Islamic world. Thus, the fundamentalist dimension of bin Ladens worldview is interwoven with resentment of Western domination. Puritanical revivalist movements calling for a return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet Muhammad have occurred periodically throughout Islamic history. During the period of European colonial rule in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, these movements began to take on a polemical, apologetic character. Muslim reformists such as Muammad Abduh (18491905) and Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn (183897) stressed that a return to the rationalist Islam of Muhammadwhich was not incompatible, in their view, with science and democracywas essential if Muslims were to free themselves from European domination. This argument was subsequently adopted by some Islamic fundamentalists, though many others condemned democracy on the grounds that only Gods laws are legitimate. Some Jewish and Christian fundamentalists have rejected democracy for the same reason. Among the Islamist movements that have attracted the most attention in the West is the Palestinian movement ams, which was founded in 1987. Its name, which means zeal in Arabic, is an acronym of the name arakat al-Muqwamah al-Islmiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement). ams was created primarily to resist what most Palestinians viewed as the occupation of their land by Israel. There is thus a clearly nationalist dimension to this movement, though it is also committed to the creation of a strictly Islamic state. ams opposed the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and insisted on fighting a jihad to expel the Israelis from all of Palestinefrom the Jordan River to the Mediterranean and from Lebanon to Egypt. It justified its terrorist attacks on Israelis as legitimate acts of war against an occupying power. Like some other Islamist movements in the Middle East, ams provides basic social servicesincluding schools, clinics, and food for the unemployedthat are not provided, or are inadequately provided, by local authorities. These charitable activities are an important source of its appeal among the Palestinian population. In January 2006 ams was the victor by a wide margin in elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, and it was asked to form a government. This development led to much speculation among political observers about whether ams could evolve into a moderate nonviolent political party, as many other terrorist groups have done (e.g., Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang in Israel and the Irish Republican Army in Ireland). Sikh fundamentalism first attracted attention in the West in 1978, when the fiery preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale reportedly led a march to break up a gathering of the Sikh Nirankari movement (from Punjabi nirankar, formless, reflecting the movements belief in the nature of God), which orthodox Sikhs considered heretical. Bhindranwale, like other fundamentalists, stressed the need for conformity to a sacred text (the Adi Granth) and for the creation of a Sikh state governed according to sacred law. But, as in the case of the Protestants of Northern Ireland, such fundamentalist concerns were subordinated to nationalistic ones. Sikh fundamentalists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries sought to create an independent Sikh state in the Indian province of Punjab. Although images of holy war pervaded their rhetoric, their primary enemy was the Hindu state of India rather than secularism per se. Sikh fundamentalism was thus primarily a nationalistic separatist movement. In June 1984, Indian troops stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar and killed Bhindranwale and hundreds of his armed supporters. The assassination, as well as what Sikhs considered the desecration of their holiest shrine, infuriated the Sikh community and led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Indias prime minister, by two of her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984. This in turn sparked riots in which Hindu mobs killed more than 2,000 Sikhs. By the early 1990s, the central government had succeeded in crushing Sikh militancy in India. What is usually called Hindu fundamentalism in India has been influenced more by nationalism than by religion, in part because Hinduism does not have a specific sacred text to which conformity can be demanded. Moreover, conformity to a religious code has never been of particular importance to Hindu groups such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). For the members of such groups, Hinduism is above all a symbol of national identity rather than a set of rules to be obeyed. The nationalistic orientation of the BJP is reflected in its name, which means the Party of the Indian People. Similarly, the name of the Rashtriya Swayamesevak Sangh (RSS), a self-defense force associated with the BJP, means National Volunteers Corps. Neither the BJP nor the RSS advocates the creation of a Hindu state. The principal concern of both groups is the danger posed to the Hindu nation by Islamic proselytization among the Scheduled Castes (formerly untouchables) and lower-caste Hindus; both groups have also vehemently opposed Christian proselytization in India for the same reason. In RSS tracts, there is little reference to specific Hindu beliefs, and its members acknowledge that they are not themselves religious. The nationalism of the BJP and the RSS is also reflected in their religious and moral demands; in this respect they differ significantly from Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States. In a notorious incident in 1992, the Babri Mosjid (Mosque of Bbur) at Ayodhya was demolished by a mob of Hindu nationalists; the subsequent rioting led to the deaths of more than 1,000 people. Although there was real religious fervour associated with the belief that the site of the mosque was the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama and the location of an ancient Hindu temple, the attack was above all a reflection of the Hindu nationalists belief in the essentially Hindu character of India and their perception of Muslims as inherently alien. The fact that Hindu nationalism is sometimes called Hindu fundamentalism illustrates how indiscriminately the term fundamentalism has been used outside its original American Protestant context. Although the terms fundamentalism and fundamentalist have entered common parlance and are now broadly applied, it should not be forgotten that the myriad movements so designated vary greatly in their origins, character, and outlook. Thus, Islamic fundamentalist movements differ from their Christian and Jewish counterparts in having begun as essentially defensive responses to European colonial domination. Early Islamic fundamentalists were reformers who wished to affirm the value of their religion by returning to what they sought to portray as its pristine original form; their movements only gradually acquired the militancy characteristic of much religious fundamentalism today. On the other hand, these movements share with Christian and Jewish fundamentalism an antipathy to secularism, an emphasis on the importance of traditional religiosity as their members understand it, and a strict adherence to sacred texts and the moral codes built upon them. Although these and other common features are important as sources of insight, each fundamentalist movement is in fact unique and is best understood when viewed in its own historical and cultural context.

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May 16, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

David Pawson – Biblical Christian Zionism

There is a rising tide of anti-semitism in British churches. Christian Zionists are charged with being politically dangerous, supporting an occupying oppressor in the Middle East and threatening world peace. They are also said to be theologically heretical for two reasons.On the one hand, they teach the very opposite of Replacement theology (the notion that the church has replaced Israel as Gods people to achieve his purpose) which has been part of Christian tradition for centuries. On the other hand, the Zionist conviction that God has brought Israel back to her own land in our day has become entangled with Dispensational theology, which is largely discredited in Britain but still widely held in America.These three talks are an integral series, aiming to lay a foundation for Biblical Christian Zionism in the New Testament. They expose the differences between this and both Replacement and Dispensational viewpoints, one too anti-Israel and the other too pro-Israel. Given in March 2007

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May 16, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 – Wikipedia

UN General AssemblyResolution 3379Date10 November 1975Meetingno.2400CodeA/RES/3379(Document)SubjectElimination of all forms of racial discrimination Voting summary United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on 10 November 1975 by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions), “determine[d] that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”. The vote took place approximately one year after UNGA 3237 granted the PLO “observer status”, following PLO president Yasser Arafat’s “olive branch” speech to the General Assembly in November 1974. The resolution was passed with the support of the Soviet bloc and other then Soviet-aligned nations, in addition to the Arab and Muslim majority countries. The determination that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”, contained in the resolution, was revoked in 1991 with UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86.[1] In July 1920, at the San Remo conference, a Class “A” League of Nations mandates over Palestine was allocated to the British. The preamble of the mandate document declared: Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[2] On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending “to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union” as Resolution 181 (II).[3] The plan contained a proposal to terminate the British Mandate for Palestine and partition Palestine into “independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.” On 14 May 1948, the day on which the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People’s Council gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum, and approved a proclamation which declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.[4] On 11 May 1949, Israel was admitted to membership in the United Nations.[5] The full text of Resolution 3379:[6] 3379 (XXX). Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that “any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous” and its expression of alarm at “the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures”, Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism, Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that “international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination”, Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered “that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being”, Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology, Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly the same day, 10 November 1975, Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog stated:[7] “I can point with pride to the Arab ministers who have served in my government; to the Arab deputy speaker of my Parliament; to Arab officers and men serving of their own volition in our border and police defense forces, frequently commanding Jewish troops; to the hundreds of thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East crowding the cities of Israel every year; to the thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East coming for medical treatment to Israel; to the peaceful coexistence which has developed; to the fact that Arabic is an official language in Israel on a par with Hebrew; to the fact that it is as natural for an Arab to serve in public office in Israel as it is incongruous to think of a Jew serving in any public office in an Arab country, indeed being admitted to many of them. Is that racism? It is not! That … is Zionism.” In his response he also said that the resolution was: “another manifestation of the bitter anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish hatred which animates Arab society. Who would have believed that in this year, 1975, the malicious falsehoods of the ‘Elders of Zion’ would be distributed officially by Arab governments? Who would have believed that we would today contemplate an Arab society which teaches the vilest anti-Jewish hate in the kindergartens? … We are being attacked by a society which is motivated by the most extreme form of racism known in the world today” Herzog ended his statement, while holding a copy of the resolution, with these words: “For us, the Jewish people, this resolution based on hatred, falsehood and arrogance, is devoid of any moral or legal value. For us, the Jewish people, this is no more than a piece of paper and we shall treat it as such.” As he concluded his speech, Herzog tore the resolution in half. The name of “The UN avenue” in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv was switched to “The Zionism avenue” as a response to the UN’s decision.[8] Before the vote, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, warned that, “The United Nations is about to make anti-Semitism international law.”[9] He delivered a speech against the resolution, including the famous line, “[The United States] does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act … A great evil has been loosed upon the world.”[10] In Campbell, California, in the United States, a group of high school students attempted to solicit signatures on the premises of a local shopping center for a petition against Resolution 3379. The result was the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) that supported states’ rights to expand the exercise of free speech, which California held was legal in what were considered public areas of a shopping mall.[11] Mexico’s vote in favor of the resolution led some United States Jews to organize a tourism boycott of Mexico. This ended after Mexican foreign minister Emilio scar Rabasa made a trip to Israel (Rabasa shortly afterward was forced to resign).[12][13] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/86, adopted on 16 December 1991, revoked the determination in Resolution 3379, which had called Zionism a form of racism.[1] Israel had made revocation of Resolution 3379 a condition of its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, in progress in the last quarter of 1991.[15] The resolution was raised under pressure from the administration of US President George H.W. Bush.[16] The text of the revocation was simply: “The General Assembly Decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.” The motion was supported by 111 (including the 90 nations who sponsored the resolution), opposed by 25 nations and abstained by 13 nations. George H. W. Bush personally introduced the motion to revoke 3379 with these words: And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to fulfill the U.N. Charter’s ambition of working “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and small to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Those are the words from the charter. We will not revive these ideals if we fail to acknowledge the challenge that the renewal of history presents. ….No one here can promise that today’s borders will remain fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful, negotiated settlement of border disputes. We also must promote the cause of international harmony by addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the charter’s pledge “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.” UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called “Zionism is racism” resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal. Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the State of Israel. And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself, a member of good standing of the United Nations.

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March 11, 2018  Tags:   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

When Zionism is the essence of life, a break has huge …

Breaking with Zionism can be a life-shattering experience. In Israel, the Jewish-Israeli society is by and large Zionist in degrees varying from the so-called liberal-Zionist to the fundamentalist Zionist. There is not really, necessarily, much of a difference when one speaks of this breaking experience in one faction or the other. The thing with Zionism is, that its adherents basically see it as a kind of essence of life. The Zionist indoctrination teaches that its about our very existence. The us is generally considered to be the Jewish nation or the Jewish people, and hence the individual is seen as a small part in this. As the survival of the whole also encompasses the individual, any breaking with Zionism is considered a kind of societal treachery, which endangers the strength and even survival of the whole. Narratives challenging the factual veracity of the survival notion, like pointing out the thriving Jewish existence elsewhere, is rather meaningless for Zionists. Under the Zionist meta-narrative, this is all temporary. Jewish thriving is temporary, and simply awaits a point in time wherein the gentiles will again turn on the Jews, because thats what happens in each and every generation, as the Passover chant goes. And the Zionist answer to this supposedly perilous, eternal state of affairs, is a Jewish nation-state. So in the bigger paradigm, Zionists simply see the solution the Jewish nation-state, as a survivalist solution. They are therefore not inclined to see any problems ensuing from it, such as human rights violations and challenging of international law, as more than mere obstacles or challenges facing this special case Israel. So when one points out these violations, this is an irritation for Zionists not necessarily because they are not aware of them but because by pointing them out, one is not showing sympathy with the challenges facing the special case that Israel is, for them. Since the case of Israel and Zionism needs a special dispensation, even an individuals emotional breaking with Zionism can be perceived as a danger. And when one thus breaks with Zionism, it is seen in highly emotional, personal terms by those for whom it represents the essence of life. That one then characterizes this kind of allegiance to the Zionist essence of life, as a kind of fascist adherence reminiscent of totalitarian societies, does nothing to add understanding amongst ones peers. It merely adds insult to injury for them. Furthermore, the talk about the intrinsic violation of human rights inherent in Zionism is only offensive to Zionists, and here particularly to the liberal Zionists, since it suggests that the whole grand ideology which they subscribe to is irreconcilable with values of equality and even democracy. Natasha Roth makes an eloquent summation of this in her article concerning the recent Israeli blacklist of BDS activists. Roth writes: The Israeli government apparently considers the banning of BDS activists acceptable behavior for a democracy, a view facilitated by its having very diligently cultivated and promoted the lie that BDS is an anti-Semitic movement aimed at destroying Israel. This lie has been remarkably successful, despite the clear statement on the official website of the BDS movement that its goal is to secure the same human and civil rights for Palestinians as everyone else living in Israeli-controlled territory. But if granting equal rights to everyone who lives in the territory controlled by Israel will cause the state to implode, then surely those who oppose BDS on those grounds are ignoring a fundamental problem that a state which cannot survive if all its residents have equal rights is by definition not a democracy. In other words, Zionism renders the supposed values of liberalism meaningless. It may well be that liberal Zionists consider liberal values to be their highest goal, but when it comes down to the competition between Zionism and liberalism, Zionists will go Zionist. Where the more fundamentalist and more unabashed fascist Zionists are concerned, this is less of an affront, because they have less of an inclination to respect the liberal notion anyway. But even fascists tend to think that their values are related to freedom and moral superiority they simply judge the others to not be part of the club. So when the break occurs, it is a break that will inevitably lead one to reconsider the totality of the indoctrination and set of values one was brought up with. One ends up having to question the nature of those values, inasmuch as they hold up such a construct Zionism to be the essence of life. If one had thought that one was brought up on values of respect, one has to then mirror that claim against the intrinsic disrespect of Zionism towards the native others Palestinians. If this mirror does not bear the picture, if this disrespect a genocidal one, let it be noted cannot be reconciled with respect, the mirror shatters. One has to re-educate and re-assemble ones whole set of values to establish a new and real concept of respect. This example pertains to a long list of values. Thus the breaking with Zionism becomes a core breaking by oneself with a whole value-system with which one was raised. Ones family and peers register that ones distance is not merely political; it is, inevitably, about ones essential nature of being. Zionists perceive this as a suggestion that they, the Zionists, are regarded as others of lesser values, and instinctively register that regard as an offense, even throwing them back to the anti-Semitic idea of Jews as lesser beings (even when it is a Jew breaking with Zionism). This is offensive to a Zionists whole being, on so many levels. They will inevitably feel a natural aversion to the person. The solution to this aversion, if the people still want to deal with one another, might simply be avoiding the topic as much as possible. But the knowing will be there. It will be like an elephant in the room, the one we cant talk about Zionism. People who are in such a society the one which upholds and enshrines Zionism know all this instinctively. The price of breaking with it can be high. Its not only a breaking with society, its a breaking with ones past. For most people, such a price is considered simply too high. But those who have realized that Palestinians are paying and have paid an incomparably high price for Zionism may find the price very tolerable and worthy. The intrinsic and general Zionist denial of Palestinian suffering is a part of this mechanism. If you deny it, and cannot feel it, then you can keep the mask, keep your self-righteousness, and keep the belief that Zionism is the only way.

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January 24, 2018   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

Is Liberal Zionism Dead? – The New York Times

Not long after Trumps announcement, the central committee of the ruling Likud Party passed a resolution calling for the de facto annexation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Knesset passed an amendment requiring a supermajority to give up Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, making a peace deal with the Palestinians even more elusive. Mustafa Barghouti, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organizations central council, told me that before Trumps decision, there was a frozen peace process, but many people believed it could be restarted. Mr. Trump killed the potential, he said. This appears to have been intentional. Writing in Fire and Fury, his new book about the Trump administration, Michael Wolff quotes Steve Bannon boasting about the implications of moving the embassy to Jerusalem, which Bannon treated as a death knell to Palestinian national aspirations. We know where were heading on this, Bannon reportedly said to the ousted Fox News chief executive Roger Ailes. Let Jordan take the West Bank, let Egypt take Gaza. Despite Bannons Great Game fantasies, thats not going to happen. Instead, if the possibility of Palestinian statehood is foreclosed, Israel will be responsible for all the territory under its control. There will be one state; the question is what sort of state it will be. Some on the Israeli right foresee a system in which most Palestinians will remain stateless indefinitely, living under a set of laws different from those governing Israeli citizens. Yoav Kish, a Likud member of Parliament, has drawn up a plan in which Palestinians in the West Bank will have limited local administrative sovereignty; rather than citizens they will be Residents of the Autonomy. Supporters of Israel hate it when people use the word apartheid to describe the country, but we dont have another term for a political system in which one ethnic group rules over another, confining it to small islands of territory and denying it full political representation. The word apartheid will become increasingly inescapable as a small but growing number of Palestinians turn from fighting for independence to demanding equal rights in the system they are living under. If the Israelis insist now on finishing the process of killing the two-state solution, the only alternative we have as Palestinians is one fully democratic, one-state solution, Barghouti says, in which everyone has totally equal rights. Needless to say, Israel will accept no such thing. Though demographics in the region are as contested as everything else, Palestinians are likely to soon become a majority of the population in Israel and the occupied territories. If all of them were given the right to vote, Israel would cease to be a Jewish state. But most of the world including most of the Jewish diaspora will have a hard time coming up with a decent justification for opposing a Palestinian campaign for equal rights. Israels apologists will be left mimicking the argument that William F. Buckley once made about the Jim Crow South. In 1957, he asked rhetorically whether the white South was entitled to prevail politically and culturally, in areas in which it does not predominate numerically. The sobering answer, he concluded, was yes, given the white communitys superior civilization. Its impossible to say how long Israel could sustain such a system. But the dream of liberal Zionism would be dead. Maybe, with the far right in power both here and there, it already is.

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January 9, 2018   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed

Zionism – Facts & Summary – HISTORY.com

Since it started more than 120 years ago, Zionism has evolved, and different ideologiespolitical, religious and culturalwithin the Zionist movement have emerged. Many self-proclaimed Zionists disagree with each other about fundamental principles. Some followers of Zionism are devoutly religious while others are more secular. Zionist lefts typically want a less-religious government and support giving up some Israeli-controlled land in exchange for peace with Arab nations. Zionist rights defend their rights to land and prefer a government based strongly on Jewish religious traditions. Advocates of the Zionist movement see it as an important effort to offer refuge to persecuted minorities and reestablish settlements in Israel. Critics, however, say its an extreme ideology that discriminates against non-Jews. For example, under Israels 1950 Law of Return, Jews born anywhere in the world have the right to become an Israeli citizen, while other people arent granted this privilege. Arabs and Palestinians living in and around Israel typically oppose Zionism. Many international Jews also disapprove of the movement because they dont believe a national homeland is essential to their religion. While this controversial movement continues to face criticism and challenges, theres no denying that Zionism has successfully bolstered the Jewish population in Israel.

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December 20, 2017   Posted in: Zionism  Comments Closed


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